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                             ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
INTERNAL CONTROL REPORTING BY NON-ACCELERATED FILERS 
by 
Vishal Munsif 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kannan Raghunandan, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Dasaratha Rama, Co-Major Professor 
 I examine three issues related to internal control reporting by non-accelerated 
filers. Motivation for the three studies comes from the fact that Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) continues to be controversial, as evidenced by the 
permanent exemption from Section 404(b) of SOX granted to non-accelerated filers by 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Dodd-
Frank Act also requires the SEC to study compliance costs associated with smaller 
accelerated filers.  
 In the first part of my dissertation, I document that the audit fee premium for 
non-accelerated filers disclosing a material weakness in internal controls (a) is 
significantly lower than the corresponding premium for accelerated filers, and (b) 
declines significantly over time. I also find that in the case of accelerated filers 
remediating clients pay lower fees compared to clients continuing to report internal 
control problems; however, such differences are not observed in the case of non-
accelerated filers. 
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 The second essay focuses on audit report lag. The results indicate that presence 
of material weaknesses are associated with increased audit report lags, for both 
accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results also indicate that the decline in 
report lag following remediation of problems is greater for accelerated filers than for 
non-accelerated filers.  
 The third essay examines early warnings (pursuant to Section 302 disclosures) 
for firms that subsequently disclosed internal control problems in their 404 reports. 
The analyses indicate that non-accelerated firms with shorter CFO tenure, presence of 
accounting experts on the audit committee, and more frequent audit committee 
meetings are more likely to provide prior Section 302 warnings.  
 Overall the results suggest that there are differences in internal control 
reporting between the accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results provide 
empirical grounding for the ongoing debate about internal control reporting by non-
accelerated filers.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Internal control reporting is an issue that has been of significant interest to 
regulators, legislators, and the accounting profession in recent years. During the 
congressional hearing about public accounting profession in 1985, many legislators 
questioned the SEC about requiring public companies to have a Management Report 
on internal controls in the audited financial statements (U.S. House of Representatives 
1985).  The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway 
Commission 1987) noted that 
“The investing public has a legitimate interest in the extent of management’s 
responsibilities for the company’s financial statements and internal control and 
the means by which management discharges its responsibilities. Yet these 
responsibilities are not always communicated to the investing public. 
Management’s opinion on internal control is important because the internal 
control system provides basis for the preparation of financial statements and, 
more broadly, the overall system of accountability.”  
 
The Treadway Commission recommended that all the publicly traded companies 
should be required to include such management report in the annual report.  
 Later, there were efforts by some legislators to mandate internal control 
reporting (U.S. House of Representatives 1991) but the efforts were not successful.  
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1992 shared support for such internal 
control reporting by the management and stated that “Public reporting encourages 
management to be proactive and pay attention to the effectiveness of internal 
controls….”  Despite such support for internal control reporting, the SEC did not 
require management to include such reporting, nor did it require the auditor to provide 
opinion on internal controls until the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 
July 2002. 
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 The fall of corporate giants like Enron and WorldCom and the failure of 
Arthur Andersen resulted in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) in 
July 2002. While SOX contains many provisions related to accounting and auditing, 
and represents the most comprehensive reform of the accounting profession since the 
1930s, Section 404 of SOX has been the most controversial. 
Section 404 of SOX is titled “Management Assessment of Internal Controls” 
and has two parts as follows: 
“ (a) Rules Required.--The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring  
each annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal  
control report, which shall-- 
            (1) state the responsibility of management for establishing  
        and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and  
        procedures for financial reporting; and 
            (2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent  
        fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal  
        control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial  
        reporting. 
  (b) Internal Control Evaluation and Reporting.--With respect to the  
internal control assessment required by subsection (a), each registered  
public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the  
issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the  
management of the issuer. An attestation made under this subsection  
shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements  
issued or adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the  
subject of a separate engagement.” 
 
Thus, the first paragraph, Section 404(a), requires management to provide an 
assessment about the effectiveness of the internal control system over financial 
reporting, and second paragraph, Section 404(b), requires auditor attestation of 
internal controls. The SEC implemented Section 404 of SOX through multiple 
instances of rulemaking. In such rulemaking, the SEC distinguished between 
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accelerated and non-accelerated filers. Non-accelerated filers are SEC registrants with 
public float of less than $75 million. 
 The requirements of SOX Section 404 have been met with a lot of criticism 
from the SEC registrants, with much of the criticism due the high cost of complying 
with Section 404. On many subsequent occasions, legislators, registrants, and business 
organizations have called for the SEC to relax its rules related to internal control 
reporting because of the high costs associated with Section 404(b). 
In response to such concerns by registrants and legislators, the SEC granted 
multiple extensions for non-accelerated filers to comply with Section 404.  Initially, 
when the SEC (2003a) issued rules to implement Section 404 of SOX, non-accelerated 
filers would have been subject to Sections 404(a) and 404(b) for fiscal years ending on 
or after April 15, 2005. In February 2004, the deadline for non-accelerated filers was 
extended to fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2005. The deadline was further 
postponed in March 2005, September 2005, December 2006 and October 2009.  
Before the final postponement for non-accelerated filers to comply with 
Section 404(b) ended, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (2010) was enacted in July 2010. Section 989G(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides 
permanent exemption from the requirements of Section 404(b) for non-accelerated 
filers.  In addition, Section 989G(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to 
conduct a study to determine how the burden of complying with Section 404(b) can be 
reduced for registrants with market capitalization up to $250 million. Thus, it is clear 
that Section 404 continues to be controversial as evidenced by the subsequent actions 
of legislators and regulators. 
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A primary reason for the numerous postponements, and the eventual 
exemption, related to compliance with Section 404(b) for non-accelerated filers is the 
cost associated with such compliance. Many SEC registrants and business 
organizations complained vehemently to the SEC about the high cost associated with 
Section 404 audits (e.g., ABA 2005; AEA 2005; FEI 2005; Microsoft 2005). In 
particular, registrants and others have complained about the impact of Section 404(b) 
on fees paid to auditors (e.g., SEC 2005, 2006).  The SEC convened two round-tables, 
in 2005 and 2006, about implementation issues related to Section 404. Following such 
dialogue, the PCAOB issued additional guidance and then replaced the much-
criticized AS No.2 with the new AS No. 5 (PCAOB 2007); AS No.5 emphasizes a 
risk-based or “top-down” approach to risks and the testing of controls and is viewed as 
the answer to criticism of over-auditing by the auditors in the initial years of 
implementing Section 404.1 
 Auditors have noted that Section 404 audits would become more efficient over 
time (e.g., Ernst & Young 2005; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005). The benefits from 
such streamlined audits would be particularly relevant for clients with internal control 
problems. In the initial years, clients with material weaknesses in internal control 
would have been particularly problematic for auditors who already had to contend 
with manpower shortages and the need to train staff in Section 404 related procedures 
even while simultaneously conducting Section 404 audits.  When auditors are under 
severe time and resource pressure for all clients it is natural that a client who requires 
                                                 
1 SEC Chairman Cox (U.S. House of Representatives 2007) noted during congressional 
testimony that “we expect the unduly high costs of implementing section 404 of the Act under 
the previous auditing standard will come down.” 
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more time and resources would be charged a higher premium. Such a fee premium can 
be expected to decline in subsequent years, when the resource pressures faced by 
auditors are lower. 
 Given such focus on audit fees in the context of Section 404 reporting, and 
given the differential treatment granted non-accelerated filers, in the first part of my 
dissertation I examine the audit fee premium associated with material weakness 
disclosures by different types of filers. Using the sample of 2,839 companies for fiscal 
year 2008 and 2009, I find that the audit fee premium for non-accelerated filers 
disclosing a material weakness in internal controls (a) is significantly lower than the 
corresponding premium paid by accelerated filers, and (b) declines significantly over 
time. I also examine subsequent remediation of internal control problems and find that 
in the case of accelerated filers remediating clients pay lower fees compared to clients 
continuing to report internal control problems; however, such differences are not 
observed in the case of non-accelerated filers.  
 Another issue that has received significant attention from the SEC in recent 
years is the reporting lag. The SEC has initiated efforts to reduce the reporting lag, 
which is the number of days from the fiscal year end until the date the audited 
financial statements are filed with the SEC (SEC 2005). Such efforts are motivated by 
concerns related to the timeliness of corporate financial reporting. 
 The second part of my dissertation deals with the association between material 
weaknesses in internal controls and audit reporting lag. I measure audit reporting lag 
as the number of days between fiscal year-end and the date of the audit report. Using 
the same sample as in part 1 of my dissertation, I find that increase in audit report lag 
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in the presence of material weaknesses in internal control is lower for non-accelerated 
filers as compared to the corresponding increase for accelerated filers. Additional 
analysis indicated that the audit report lag falls significantly from fiscal 2008 to 2009 
for the accelerated filers as compared to the non-accelerated filers. Further, the results 
also indicate that for firms that remediate previously disclosed internal control 
problems there is a steep decline in audit report lag for accelerated filers; the decline is 
not significant in the case of non-accelerated filers. 
 The third essay of my dissertation examines early warnings provided by firms 
pursuant to Section 302 disclosures. Section 302 of SOX, titled “Corporate 
Responsibility for Financial Reports,” states as follows: 
    “(a) Regulations Required.--The Commission shall, by rule, require,  
for each company filing periodic reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of  
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78o(d)), that the  
principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial  
officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions, certify in  
each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted under either such  
section of such Act that-- 
            (1) the signing officer has reviewed the report; 
            (2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not  
        contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state  
        a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,  
        in light of the circumstances under which such statements were  
        made, not misleading; 
            (3) based on such officer's knowledge, the financial  
        statements, and other financial information included in the  
        report, fairly present in all material respects the financial  
        condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and  
        for, the periods presented in the report; 
            (4) the signing officers-- 
                    (A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining  
                internal controls; 
                    (B) have designed such internal controls to ensure  
                that material information relating to the issuer and its  
                consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers  
                by others within those entities, particularly during the  
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                period in which the periodic reports are being prepared; 
                    (C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's  
                internal controls as of a date within 90 days prior to  
                the report; and 
                    (D) have presented in the report their conclusions  
                about the effectiveness of their internal controls based  
                on their evaluation as of that date; 
            (5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer's  
        auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors (or  
        persons fulfilling the equivalent function)-- 
                    (A) all significant deficiencies in the design or  
                operation of internal controls which could adversely  
                affect the issuer's ability to record, process,  
                summarize, and report financial data and have identified  
                for the issuer's auditors any material weaknesses in  
                internal controls; and 
                    (B) any fraud, whether or not material, that  
                involves management or other employees who have a  
                significant role in the issuer's internal controls; and 
            (6) the signing officers have indicated in the report  
        whether or not there were significant changes in internal  
        controls or in other factors that could significantly affect  
        internal controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation,  
        including any corrective actions with regard to significant  
        deficiencies and material weaknesses.” 
 
Prior researchers have noted that while there are some differences between 
Sections 302 and 404, there also are many similarities (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al 2007, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009, Beneish et al. 2008, Ogneva et al. 2007). One of the 
primary differences is that Section 302 disclosures are not subject to auditor 
attestation, unlike Section 404 disclosures. As such, there is significant managerial 
judgment associated with Section 302 disclosures. 
 However,  given the importance attached by legislators and regulators to 
internal control disclosures, it is particularly relevant to examine the extent to which 
adverse Section 404 disclosures are preceded by early warnings in the form of Section 
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302 disclosures. It is reasonable to expect that if management and/or audit committee 
is diligent and forthcoming, there would be prior warnings in the form of 302 
disclosures prior to the disclosure of material weaknesses pursuant to Section 404. 
 Hence, I examine firms that subsequently disclosed material weaknesses in 
their Section 404 reports to see if they had previously disclosed internal control 
problems in their Section 302 disclosures. The analysis indicate that for non-
accelerated filers firms with shorter CFO tenure, greater number of audit committee 
members, higher number of accounting experts, and more audit committee meetings 
tend to provide prior Section 302 warnings as compared to firms that do not provide 
such warnings. In the case of accelerated filers, the only significant differences 
between those with and without early warning are CFO tenure and number of audit 
committee meetings. As part of my additional analyses, I examine the consequences 
for firms without prior warnings in the form of Section 302 disclosures. I find that 
only a small minority of firms without prior 302 disclosures receive a comment letter 
from the SEC. This finding indicates that the regulatory penalty for non-compliance 
(in the form of prior 302 disclosures) is not very significant for firms with respect to 
internal control disclosures. 
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II discusses 
the internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers: impact on audit fees. Chapter 
III provides empirical tests on the association between presence of internal control 
weaknesses in audit report lag for non-accelerated filers and how they differ for that 
for accelerated filers. Chapter IV of my dissertation provides a statistical comparison 
between firms that provide early warnings under Section 302 and firms that do not for 
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both the accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The dissertation concludes with 
summaries and discussions on the results of the previous sections.  
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II. INTERNAL CONTROL REPORTING AND AUDIT FEES FOR NON-
ACCELERATED FILERS 
 
 Section 404(a) of SOX requires management to include a report about internal 
controls over financial reporting in annual financial statements filed with the SEC. 
Section 404(b) requires auditor attestation of such internal control reports by 
management.  
 SEC registrants and others have complained about the significant costs 
associated with the implementation of SOX Section 404. While audit fees represent 
only one component of costs associated with Section 404 reporting, such fees 
constitute a significant and recurring component of such costs.  Complaints about the 
significant increase in audit fees subsequent to the implementation of SOX Section 
404 has been voiced by SEC registrants and others. For example, at the Roundtable on 
Implementation of Internal Control Reporting Provisions convened by the SEC in 
April 2005, participants noted that audit fees constituted a significant part of total 
costs associated with Section 404, and that such fees increased significantly from the 
pre-SOX period (SEC 2005). Audit firms also have acknowledged the role of Section 
404 in the steep increase in fees subsequent to SOX.  For example, the CEOs of the 
Big 4 audit firms acknowledged significant criticism from their clients and others 
about the substantial increases in audit fees (the CEO of Ernst & Young noted that 
“much of the debate regarding the high costs of 404 implementation seems to be 
centered on audit fees” (EY 2005).  
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 As discussed in the Introduction, legislators and others have also paid 
signfiicant attention to the impact of such high costs on non-accelerated filers. Such 
focus on audit fees and non-accelerated filers provides the motivation to examine the 
effect of Section 404 on audit fees of non-accelerated filers. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Prior Research on Internal Control Disclosures and Audit Fees 
Raghunandan and Rama (RR 2006) examine 660 manufacturing firms with a 
December 31, 2004 fiscal year end that had filed their 10-Ks by May 15, 2005, and 
find that audit fees are 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness 
disclosure compared to clients without such disclosure. By construction, all firms in 
their sample are accelerated firms. RR (2006) note, that in their sample, there was not 
a significant difference between systemic and non-systemic weaknesses in terms of the 
impact on audit fees. 
 Hoitash et al. (HHB 2008) use a sample of 2,501 accelerated filers with 
available data for fiscal years from November 2004 through October 2005 (i.e., the 
first fiscal year of SOX 404) and find that the fee premium varies by problem severity 
(measured either as material weaknesses versus significant deficiencies, or by general 
versus account specific); in contrast to RR (2006), HHB (2008) find that systemic 
weaknesses have a greater impact on audit fees than non-systemic weaknesses. Both 
of the above papers use data only from the first year of compliance with Section 404. 
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In contrast to the above two studies that examined the effect of material 
weakness disclosures made pursuant to Section 404(b) of SOX, Hogan and Wilkins 
(2008) examine audit fees prior to the implementation of SOX Section 404. They find 
that audit fees are higher for clients that disclosed an internal control weakness 
pursuant to Section 302 of SOX after July 2002.  
While the above studies examined the effect of internal control weakness 
disclosures on audit fees, Krishnan et al. (2008) analyze voluntary disclosures by 266 
firms about total costs to comply with Section 404. It is important to note that audit 
fees are only one component of the total fees examined by Krishnan et al. (2008). 
These authors find that the total SOX compliance costs are higher in the presence of 
material weaknesses in internal control. 
While RR (2006) and HHB (2008) examine the effect of internal control 
weaknesses on audit fees, both of the above studies focus only on the initial years of 
SOX 404(b) reporting. As noted earlier, it is likely that the association between 
material weaknesses and audit fees would moderate over time. This is the rationale for 
Munsif et al. (2011), who examine audit fees for accelerated filers from 2004 to 2007; 
these authors find that firms remediating internal control weaknesses have lower audit 
fees when compared to firms continuing to report material weaknesses in internal 
control; however, the remediating firms pay, in the year of remediation as well as one 
and two years subsequent to remediation, significantly higher audit fees compared to 
firms that have clean Section 404 reports in each of the first four years. 
 In summary, almost all of the prior research related to the association between 
internal control reporting and audit fees has concentrated on accelerated filers. Given 
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the significant interest of legislators and others in internal control reporting by non-
accelerated filers, it is important to examine the association between internal control 
reporting and audit fees by non-accelerated filers. 
 One prior published study has examined the association between internal 
control problem disclosures and audit fees for non-accelerated filers.  Bedard et al. 
(2008) in their paper examine the association between audit fees with disclosures 
regarding the effectiveness of internal control under Section 302 of SOX for non-
accelerated filers. Using data from fiscal 2003 and 2004 with the sample size of 4,492 
firm years the authors find that firms disclosing Section 302 material weaknesses pay 
higher audit fees than firms that did not disclose such weaknesses. They also find that 
firms remediating internal control problems disclosed in fiscal 2003 continue to pay 
higher fees in 2004. 
 It is important to note that the sample in Bedard et al. (2008) stops with 2004. 
In addition, their focus is on internal control reporting pursuant to Section 302 
disclosures, not Section 404 disclosures. Much has changed in the market for audit 
services since 2004 and, as noted previously, there are significant differences between 
Sections 302 and 404 of SOX. In the first part of my dissertation, I examine the 
association between material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting 
and audit fees, for non-accelerated filers using Section 404(a) disclosures made in 
2008 and 2009. 
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Remediation of Internal Control Weaknesses  
 Internal control systems are dynamic. Problems identified in one period may 
be remediated after discovery. It is natural for investors and others to be interested in 
the remediation of problems that are disclosed by companies. For example, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2009) find that firms that had disclosed such internal control weaknesses 
but later received a clean Section 404 opinion exhibit an average decrease in market-
adjusted cost of equity of 151 basis points around the disclosure of the opinion. Given 
the significant research interest in internal control disclosures, a natural extension of 
such research relates to the remediation of previously disclosed internal control 
problems. 
 In contrast to the extensive literature on internal control weakness disclosures, 
research related to remediation of previously disclosed problems is sparse. Johnstone 
et al. (2010) use sample of 3,602 firm-year observations with no material weaknesses 
disclosure to 733 firm-year observations with material weaknesses disclosure for fiscal 
years 2004 through 2007. The authors test a conceptual model of the process that firms 
use to remediate negative events such as fraud, restatements and/or internal control 
weaknesses (they focus mainly on internal control weaknesses) and the role of 
governance structure changed. The results suggest a positive association between 
material weakness disclosures and subsequent turnover of member of boards of 
directors, audit committee and top management. Johnstone et al. (2010) also find that 
remediation is associated with improvements in characteristics of audit committees, 
boards, and top management. 
15 
 
Li et al. (2010) examine the interrelationships among material weakness 
disclosures, the qualification of chief financial officers (CFOs) and their turnover 
following material weakness disclosures, and the remediation of material weaknesses.   
Li et al. (2010) show that remediation is more likely following the hiring of a new 
CFO with better qualifications.  
Feng et al. (2010) examine the relationship between internal control quality 
and the accuracy of management guidance. The authors find that management 
forecasts become more accurate after firms remediate material weaknesses. 
 In summary, prior research has examined characteristics of firms that 
remediate previously disclosed internal control problems and the effects of 
remediation on some outcomes. It is worthwhile to note that all of the above 
referenced studies examining remediation have focused on accelerated filers. No prior 
published study has examined remediation of internal control weaknesses by non-
accelerated filers who had previously disclosed such problems. In the first part of my 
dissertation, I examine the effect of remediation of previously disclosed internal 
control problems on audit fees, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
As noted previously, while both Sections 404(a) and 404(b) are applicable for 
accelerated filers, only Section 404(a) is applicable for non-accelerated filers. Thus, 
auditor attestation of internal control reporting is not required for non-accelerated 
filers. Hence, the auditor’s involvement in internal control assessment is significantly 
lower in the case of non-accelerated filers than in the case of accelerated filers. This in 
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turn suggests that the association between internal control weaknesses and audit fees 
should be lower for non-accelerated filers than for accelerated filers. 
In addition, post-SOX the extent of competition is much greater in the small 
client segment of the audit market (GAO 2003; Kohlbeck et al. 2008). Increased 
competition also should mean that the pressures on higher fees should be more muted 
in the small client segment. Since non-accelerated filers are, by definition, smaller 
than accelerated filers, I expect that the association between material weaknesses in 
internal control and audit fees would be smaller for non-accelerated filers than for 
accelerated filers. 
As noted earlier, prior studies related to the association between internal 
control quality and audit fees focus on accelerated filers or have used data from 
Section 302 disclosures. I fill this void in the literature, and examine the differential 
impact of internal control weakness disclosures on audit fees for non-accelerated and 
accelerated filers. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, I expect that the 
association between material weaknesses in internal control and audit fees would be 
lower in case of non-accelerated filers. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The audit fee premium associated with material weaknesses in internal 
control is lower for non-accelerated filers than for accelerated filers.  
 
 As noted previously, research related to remediation of internal control 
problems is sparse. In the context of audit fees, Bedard et al. (2008) find that even 
after remediating the non-accelerated filers continued to pay higher audit fees than 
17 
 
those firms that had clean internal control report in both years (fiscal 2003 and 2004). 
However, their analysis is based on Section 302 disclosures, not Section 404 
disclosures. 
Hammerseley et al. (2009) examine firms with a material internal control 
weakness in year 1, and show that the remediating firms had a lower audit fee 
premium in year 2 of SOX 404 reporting compared to firms that did not remediate 
their internal control problems.  
Munsif et al. (2011), also, find that firms remediating internal control 
weaknesses have lower audit fees when compared to firms continuing to report 
material weaknesses in internal control. However, these remediating firms continue to 
pay a premium not only the year of remediation but also one and two years after 
remediation. 
Both Hammerseley et al. (2009) and Munsif et al. (2011) examine the impact 
of internal control weakness disclosures on audit fees only for the accelerated filers in 
the early years of SOX Section 404 reporting. Hammerseley et al. (2009) only 
investigate the first two years of Section 404 reporting and Munsif et al. (2011) 
examine the data from fiscal 2004 through 2007.  The same arguments about 
differences between accelerated and non-accelerated filers, noted in the context of 
hypothesis one above, also are relevant in the context of examining the effects of 
remediation of previously disclosed internal control weaknesses on audit fees. This 
leads to my second hypothesis, which is: 
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H2:  The effects of remediating previously disclosed internal control weaknesses 
on audit fees are lower for non-accelerated filers than for accelerated filers. 
METHOD 
 I use the following model to examine the association between audit fees and 
material weaknesses in internal control: 
LAFEE            = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA + b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + b11*MW + b12-
21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LAFEE  = natural log of audit fees; 
LNTA  = natural log of client’s total assets; 
RECINV = proportion of total assets in accounts receivable and inventory; 
SQSEG  = square root of the number of segments; 
FORGN = 1 if the firm has foreign operations, else 0; 
LIQ  = ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities; 
ROA  = return on assets (operating income divided by total assets); 
DA  = total debt divided by total assets; 
BIG4  = 1 if Big 4 auditor, else 0; 
GC  = 1 if audit opinion modified for going concern, else 0; 
INITIAL = 1 if the audit engagement is in their first year, else 0; 
MW  = 1 if material weakness in internal control, else 0. 
 All of the control variables are derived from prior studies (e.g., Raghunandan 
and Rama 2006) and the variables are measured as of the relevant fiscal year ends. I 
use LNTA as control variable to proxy for size; for client complexity, I use RECINV, 
19 
 
SQSEG, and FORGN. Client financial condition is measured with LIQ, ROA, DA and 
GC. Following much of prior audit fee research, I use the BIG4 variable for auditor 
type. Since prior research suggests that initial year audit clients pay a fee discount 
(e.g., Francis and Simon 1987), I include INITIAL.  I winsorize LIQ, ROA and DA at 
absolute values of 10 and other continuous variables at the 1st and the 99th percentiles.  
As part of my additional analyses, I partition internal control weaknesses based 
on the type of problem. In such analyses, following prior research (e.g., Hoitash et al. 
2008, Doyle et al. 2007, Ettredge et al. 2006, Johmstone et al. 2010; Munsif et al. 
2011), I distinguish between general and account specific internal control problems. If 
a firm reported both systemic and account specific internal control problems, then I 
code that company as having a systemic problem. A firm coded as having only 
account-specific problems by definition has no systemic problem.  Following Munsif 
et al. (2011), I classify an internal control weakness as systemic if, per Audit 
Analytics, the problem was in any one or more of the following categories: senior 
management competency, tone, reliability issues; accounting personnel resources, 
competency/training; segregations of duties/ design of controls (personnel); 
information technology, software, security & access issue; ethical or compliance 
issues with personnel; ineffective, non-existent or understaffed audit committee; 
insufficient or non-existent internal audit function; ineffective regulatory compliance 
issues.  
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SAMPLE 
 I obtain the data about audit fees and material internal control weakness for 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009 from the Audit Analytics database.2 The relevant financial 
data are obtained from the Compustat annual database.  
 In Panel A of Table 1, I present my data selection process for this analysis. I 
start with 9,828 observations in fiscal year 2008. First I deleted 1,659 foreign firms; 
next, following the tradition in audit fee research, I deleted 2,121 observations in the 
financial sector (SIC 60-67). After deleting 133 duplicate observations, I then deleted 
1,613 observations that have fiscal year ends other than between December 15th and 
February 28th. The December 15th cutoff is used because Section 404(a) became 
applicable only for fiscal year ends on or after December 15, 2007. Similarly, I use the 
February 28 cutoff to ensure that the firms are comparable. Without such date cutoffs, 
for instance, a firm with fiscal year end of December 1, 2009 would be treated on par 
with a firm having a fiscal year end of March 31, 2009. While both firms would 
technically still be in the second year of Section 404(a) reporting, the time elapsed is 
such that both clients and auditors would have obtained substantial learning curve 
effects in the former case than in the latter. Such learning curve effects could influence 
the results, hence the need for a tight fiscal year end cutoff restriction. 
 For the remaining 3,234 observations I obtain financial data from the 
Compustat database. I delete another 30 observations due to missing financial 
information and 98 observations due to missing audit fee information. My final sample 
                                                 
2 I use the year of Section 404 filing opinion available in the Audit Analytics database.  
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size for fiscal 2008 is 3,106. I follow the same process for fiscal 2009; the final sample 
size for fiscal 2009 is 2,933 observations.  
 Since my main analysis measures the impact of audit fees over two years, I 
delete all observations that are not common in both years (fiscal 2008 and 2009). This 
process yields a final sample size of 2,839 for each fiscal year 2008 and 2009. In Panel 
B of Table 1 I divide the sample by type of filer status – viz. Accelerated and Non-
Accelerated. For fiscal year 2008 (2009) there are 2,003 (1,973) accelerated filers and 
836 (866) non-accelerated filers.  
 I classify any company that had both management and auditor’s report and as 
accelerated filers and any company that only had management report as non-
accelerated filers. In other words, I classify any company that had both Section 404(a) 
and 404(b) internal control reports as an accelerated filer and any company that 
complied only with Section 404(a) as a non-accelerated filer.    
Panel C of Table 1 provides information regarding the number of material 
weaknesses (systemic and account-specific) by filer type. For fiscal 2008 (2009) out of 
184 (171) observations, there are 53 (32) accelerated filers and 131 (139) non-
accelerated filers with systemic material weaknesses; there are 35 (26) accelerated 
filers and 24 (30) non-accelerated filers with only account-specific material 
weaknesses for fiscal year 2008 (2009). 
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RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 Table 2 provides descriptive data about the sample for fiscal 2008 and 2009, 
for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The data is partitioned by internal 
control opinion type. For both years, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers, 
firms with material weaknesses are significantly smaller in size (measured by LNTA). 
In both 2008 and 2009 the mean audit fees paid by firms with material weaknesses is 
lower than the audit fees paid by firms with no material weaknesses for both 
accelerated and non-accelerated filers. This can be explained by the fact that the firms 
that reported material weaknesses are smaller than firms that did not report material 
weaknesses.  
 The data also show that firms with material weaknesses are less profitable, as 
measured by ROA; for the accelerated filers 2008 (2009) the mean ROA is -0.20 (-
0.20) for firms with material weaknesses as compared to -0.08 (-0.04) for firms 
without material weaknesses in internal control. For the non-accelerated filers the 
mean ROA is -2.47 (-1.98) for firms with material weaknesses as compared to -0.76 (-
0.68) for firms without material weaknesses in internal control. The data also show 
that firms with material weaknesses are less likely to have Big4, are more likely to 
have a modified opinion due to going concern, and more likely to switch auditors. 
Further, in the case of non-accelerated filers, firms with material weaknesses are less 
likely to have foreign operations and are less liquid, as compared to firms with no such 
disclosures.  
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Regression Samples 
 For my regression analysis I use four different sample sizes. First, I run the 
main analysis for both fiscal year 2008 and 2009 using the full sample of 2,839 
observations – divided into accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers. Next, I use a 
sub-sample of firms by taking only those accelerated filers that are not classified as 
large-accelerated filers in the Audit Analytics database and compare those results with 
those for non-accelerated filers. The sample size for this analysis is 1,801 for 2008 and 
1,812 for 2009. I then use a restricted sample by using only those observations that are 
common in both years; this yields a sample size of 1,657 each for 2008 and 2009. 
Finally, for sensitivity analysis, I restrict the sample to only those observations that 
have the same filing status in both years – i.e., a firm should have filed as accelerated 
filer in both years or as non-accelerated filer in both years.   
 
Impact of Material Weakness on Audit fees (H1) 
 Table 3 shows the results for the first regression for the full sample with MW 
as the variable of interest. Each of the results for both accelerated and non-accelerated 
filers are significant and explain between 70 and 74 percent of audit fees of my sample 
firms. All of the control variables for accelerated and non-accelerated filers in fiscal 
2008 and 2009 are significant with the exception of GC for non-accelerated filers and 
LIQ for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers.   
An interesting observation is that the coefficient of INITIAL is negative and 
significant, indicating that there is a substantial initial year fee discount. Huang et al. 
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(2007) find that there is no initial year fee discounting in the immediate aftermath of 
SOX; the negative coefficient of INITIAL for my sample suggests that the market for 
audit services has changed significantly in more recent years, and that the 
phenomenon of auditors discounting initial year audit fees is back. One implication of 
this finding is that the market for audit services has become more competitive in 2008 
and 2009.  This finding corroborates the evidence in ComplianceWeek (2010) that the 
median audit fees declined by 5.4 percent from 2008 and 2009 for the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 firms, with 317 of the firms reporting lower audit fees in 2009 compared to 
the previous year.  
 The regression for fiscal year 2008 shows that the coefficient of MW is 0.25 for 
accelerated filers and 0.13 for the non-accelerated filers; this indicates that firms with 
material weakness in their internal control reporting face a fee increase of 29 percent 
and 14 percent for accelerated and non-accelerated filers respectively.3  
 It is interesting to note that the coefficient for MW declines significantly from 
fiscal 2008 to 2009 for the non-accelerated filers, but not for the accelerated filers. The 
coefficient for fiscal 2009 for accelerated filers is 0.26 (p < .01) and non-accelerated 
filers is 0.06 (p =.10). The decline is statistically significant (p < .05) for non-
accelerated filers, but not for accelerated filers. 
 I further divide material weakness in internal control into the following two 
types: Systemic internal control weaknesses (SMW) and Account Specific internal 
                                                 
3 The effect of having a material weakness on audit fees is calculated as follows. When a firm has a 
material weakness in internal control in the first year, MW becomes 1. Thus, the value of the dependent 
variable in our regression increases by 0.25*1 = 0.25. Since our dependent variable is log transformed, 
the effect of the dependent variable increasing by 0.25 is given by e0.25 = 1.29, or the fee increases by 29 
percent compared to the situation when there is no material weakness in internal controls. 
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control weaknesses (AMW).4  Prior research (e.g., Hoitash et al. 2008; Munsif et al. 
2011) shows that systemic problems are more difficult to audit around, so the effect on 
audit fees should be higher for systemic internal control problems than for account-
specific problems. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that for the accelerated filers the systemic 
weaknesses have higher impact on audit fees as compared to account-specific 
weaknesses; these results are similar to those presented in by Munsif et al. (2011). 
However, the results indicate that for non-accelerated filers the impact on audit fees is 
higher in the presence of account-specific weaknesses. The coefficient is 0.34 (p = 
<.01) for SMW and 0.11 (p = .13) for AMW for accelerated filers, while the 
coefficients are 0.10 (p = .10) and 0.34 (p = .01) for SMW and AMW, respectively for 
the non-accelerated filers in fiscal 2008. Similarly, for fiscal 2009 the coefficient for 
SMW is 0.47 (p < .01) and AMW is 0.02 (p = .43) for the accelerated filers, indicating 
higher impact of systemic internal control weaknesses on audit fees. However, the 
coefficients for non-accelerated filers are 0.01 (p = .41) for SMW and 0.23 (p = .03) 
for AMW, indicating higher impact on audit fees due to account specific internal 
control weaknesses. The overall models for all of the regressions are significant with 
adjusted R-squares ranging from 70 to 74 percent.  
 In summary, results from the above regressions show that the impact of 
material weaknesses in internal control on audit fees is lower for the non-accelerated 
                                                 
4 Note that if a firm reported both systemic and account specific internal control problems, then I code 
that company as having a systemic problem. In only those instances where a firm has no systemic 
problem but indicates the presence of one or more account specific problems I code that firm as having 
a account specific problem. In other words, a firm coded as having only account specific problems by 
definition has no systemic problem. 
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filers than accelerated filers. In addition, the effect of systemic and account specific 
weaknesses on audit fees differ for accelerated and non-accelerated filers. 
 
Results for sub-sample (non-large accelerated filers) 
 I run similar regressions as in Table 3 for my sub-sample of non-large 
accelerated filers. The results are presented in Table 7 and Table 8. As mentioned 
before for my sub-sample I use firms that are classified as accelerated filers other than 
large-accelerated filers.5  The overall results are significant with adjusted R-squares 
between 50 and 70 percent. The results show that audit fee premium for firms with 
material weaknesses declines over time for both the non-large accelerated and non-
accelerated filers. The coefficient for fiscal 2008 (2009) for non-large accelerated filer 
is 0.29 (0.24) indicating a fee premium of 34 (27) percent for firms disclosing material 
weaknesses in their internal controls as compared to firms that have no such 
disclosures. Both the coefficients are significant at 1 percent. Since the sample of non-
accelerated filers is the same as in my main analysis the results remain the same for 
the non-accelerated filers with coefficient of 0.13 (p = .03) and 0.06 (p = .10) for fiscal 
2008 and 2009, respectively.  
 In Table 8, I further restrict the sample size to those firms that are common in 
both 2008 and 2009. The results confirm the results presented in the main analysis and 
the analysis in Table 7. Both the non-large accelerated and non-accelerated filers see a 
                                                 
5 Large-accelerated filers are those with a public float of more than $700 million measured as of the last 
day of the second quarter. Other accelerated filers are those with public float between $75 million and 
$700 million measure as of the last day of the second quarter. I classify firms as accelerated and large-
accelerated based on the classification provided by the Audit Analytics database.  
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decline in premium charged from fiscal 2008 to fiscal 2009, in fact the coefficient for 
non-accelerated filers in 2009 is not significant with p-value of 0.18.  
All of the results above, including the main analysis and analysis using the 
sub-samples, also confirm my first hypothesis that the fee premium associated with 
material weaknesses in internal controls is significantly lower for non-accelerated 
filers as compared to accelerated filers.   
 
Impact of Remediation on audit fees (H2) 
 To measure the impact of remediation, it is necessary to look at only those 
firms that have clean opinion in fiscal 2009. In other words, I examine the effects of 
remediation by comparing firms that remediated previously disclosed problems 
against firms without problems. Hoitash et al. (2008) find that accelerated filers with 
clean Section 404 opinion after disclosing weaknesses under Section 302 continue to 
pay higher fees; similarly Bedard et al. (2008) show the aforementioned results for the 
non-accelerated filers. Munsif et al. (2011), using the data from fiscal 2004 through 
fiscal 2007, confirm these results in their analysis and show that firms that disclose 
material weaknesses not only pay a premium in the year of disclosure but continue to 
pay premium in the year of remediation and one and two years after remediation. But 
none of these studies compare the results between accelerated and non-accelerated 
filers or compare the results having internal control weaknesses under Section 404 for 
non-accelerated filers. The comparison is especially interesting for the non-accelerated 
filers as the auditor’s responsibility for internal controls is much lower for such firms 
as compared to that for the accelerated filers.  
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 Table 5 presents the results of remediation for both accelerated filers and non-
accelerated filers, as well as the overall sample. I include the MW_08 variable 
(material weakness in 2008) in the 2009 regression to measure the impact of having a 
material weakness in 2008 in the fiscal year 2009, i.e. measure the impact on audit 
fees in the year of remediation.  The regressions are significant with adjusted R-
squares between 70 and 82 percent. The results indicate that the auditors continue to 
charge a premium in the year of remediation not only for the accelerated filers but also 
for the non-accelerated filers; the result for the overall sample is also similar. The 
coefficient for accelerated filers is 0.16 (p = .03) and for non-accelerated filers is 0.14 
(p = .05), indicating that firms pay a premium of 17 percent and 15 percent in the year 
of remediation in the case of accelerated and non-accelerated filers, respectively. The 
result for non-accelerated filers is especially interesting because, as mentioned before, 
the auditor’s risk and involvement in internal controls is lower as compared to that for 
the accelerated filers.   
 Next, I measure whether remediation in internal controls leads to any reduction 
in audit fee premium for the accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers.6 I use similar 
analysis as in Munsif et al. (2011), and hence restrict the analysis to only those firms 
that have material weaknesses in 2008.  
Table 6 presents the results for remediation, with REMEDIATE as the variable 
of interest. There are 243 firms that had material weaknesses in fiscal 2008, of which 
113 remediated in fiscal 2009 and 130 continued to have material weaknesses. The 
                                                 
6 Hammersley et al. (2009) show that firms that remediate internal control weaknesses pay 
lower premium as firms that continue to have material weaknesses in their internal control .  
29 
 
results indicate the remediation of internal control weaknesses does not lead to 
reduction in audit fee premium for either the accelerated or the non-accelerated filers. 
The overall regressions are significant with R-squares between 56 and 77 percent. 
Although the coefficient for accelerated filers is negative (-0.23), it is not significant at 
conventional levels; in the case of non-accelerated filers, the coefficient of 
REMEDIATE is 0.01 (p = .49). 
The results in Table 6 in conjunction with those in Table 5 indicate that the 
firms disclosing a material weakness in internal controls pay a premium not only in 
the year of disclosure but also in the year of remediation; this is true for both the 
accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers. The results also show that remediating 
firms do not see a reduction in audit fee premium in the year of remediation, for both 
accelerated and non-accelerated filers. However, these results are subject to one 
important caveat. The remediation variable might not be significant due to limitation 
of small sample size; for instance the sample of accelerated filers is only 83 as 
compared to 165 for Munsif et al. (2011).   
 Next, I run the regressions with the sub-sample of firms that exclude large-
accelerated filers. Since I am measuring the impact of remediation over two years I 
only run regressions for firms that are common in both years.  
 Table 9 presents the results for regressions similar to those in Table 5. To 
measure the impact on audit fee premium in the year of remediation I include MW_08 
in the 2009 regression for the sub-sample of firms without large-accelerated filers.7  
The results in Table 9 are consistent with those in Table 5; the results show that for 
                                                 
7 Please refer to footnote 5 for definition of large-accelerated filers versus accelerated filers.  
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both the non-large accelerated and non-accelerated filers, the coefficient of MW_08 is 
positive and significant. The coefficient for non-large accelerated filer is 0.21 (p =.02) 
and non-accelerated filers is 0.19 (p = .03).  
 The results in Table 10 are consistent with those in Table 6, indicating that 
both non-large accelerated and non-accelerated filers do not see a reduction in audit 
fee premium in the year of remediation. The coefficient of REMEDIATE is -0.19 (p = 
.28) for non-large accelerated filers and 0.01 (p = .45) for the non-accelerated filers. 
The coefficient for overall sample is -0.04 (p = .37).  
 The results for both the full sample and sub-sample indicate that both 
accelerated and non-accelerated filers continue to pay a premium in the year of 
remediation and also these remediating firms do not see a reduction in audit fee 
premium in the year of remediation.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Results of Same Filer Status (non-large accelerated filers) 
 I also run regressions for sub-samples of firms that had the same filer status in 
both fiscal 2008 and 2009. I first restrict the sample to non-large accelerated filers and 
non-accelerated filers (as discussed in footnote 5). I then delete firms that switched 
filer status, either from accelerated to non-accelerated or vise-versa.  
 The results in Table 11 show a similar pattern to the results presented in Table 
7. The results indicate that the impact on audit fees due to presence of material 
weaknesses in internal controls is higher for non-large accelerated filers as compared 
to non-accelerated filers, although the fee premium for non-large accelerated filers 
declines from fiscal 2008 to fiscal 2009. The results indicate that the impact of 
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material internal control weaknesses on audit fees is higher for the accelerated filers as 
compared to non-accelerated filers.  
 Tables 12 and 13 confirm the results presented in Tables 9 and 10. The results 
indicate that both the non-large accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers continue 
to pay a premium in the year of remediation and that these firms do not see a drop in 
audit fee premium in the year of remediation.  
 Taken together, the results are consistent with my main analysis and confirm 
my hypotheses: (1) the audit fee premium associated with a material weakness in 
internal controls in lower for the non-accelerated filers as compared to accelerated 
filers and, (2) non-accelerated filers continue to pay a premium in the year of 
remediation.  
 
SUMMARY  
 Legislators and regulators have paid significant attention in recent years to 
internal control reporting, and such attention is particularly pronounced for non-
accelerated filers. Some recent studies (Raghunandan and Rama 2006, Hoitash et al. 
2008, Munsif et al. 2011) have examined the association between material weakness 
in internal controls and audit fees, but these studies examine the impact of material 
weaknesses in internal control for accelerated filers. One prior published study has 
examined the association between internal control problem disclosures and audit fees 
for non-accelerated filers.  Bedard et al. (2008) in their paper examine the association 
between audit fees with disclosures regarding the effectiveness of internal control 
under Section 302 of SOX for non-accelerated filers. The authors find that firms 
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disclosing Section 302 material weaknesses pay higher audit fees than firms that did 
not disclose such weaknesses. They also find that firms remediating internal control 
problems disclosed in fiscal 2003 continue to pay higher fees in 2004. 
 In this study, I examine (a) the associations between the presence and 
remediation of internal control problems and audit fees for non-accelerated filers, and 
(b) how such associations differ for non-accelerated filers from those for accelerated 
filers. The results indicate that the association between audit fees and presence of 
material weaknesses is positive for accelerated as well as for the non-accelerated 
filers, although I find that the risk premium for non-accelerated filers disclosing a 
material weakness in internal controls (pursuant to management evaluation of internal 
controls required by Section 404(a) of SOX) is proportionately significantly lower 
than the corresponding premium paid by accelerated filers. However, the results also 
indicate the audit fee premium for both the accelerated and non-accelerated filers 
continue to persist in the year of remediation and neither of the two filers see a 
reduction in audit fees.  The results suggest that although the auditors price internal 
control weaknesses for accelerated and non-accelerated filers differently, they treat 
both filers similarly when it comes to remediation of such internal control problems. 
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III. INTERNAL CONTROL REPORTING AND AUDIT REPORT LAGS FOR 
NON-ACCELERATED FILERS 
 
 Regulators have always been concerned about the need for timely financial 
information for investors and other financial statement users. Timeliness is recognized 
as one of the fundamental characteristics of financial information that makes it useful.  
Prior studies have shown that late disclosure of accounting information can lead to 
higher degree of information asymmetry, and non-timely information has led to 
negative market reaction (Bamber et al. 1993; Dopuch et al. 1986; Fields and Wilkins 
1991).  
The fall of Enron and WorldCom led to the enactment of one the most 
important acts in the field of accounting and auditing: Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 
2002). SOX significantly changed the landscape of accounting and auditing. While 
SOX has many sections, Section 404 of SOX deals with internal control reporting is 
arguably the most controversial of the various new requirements mandated by SOX.  
Section 404(a) of SOX requires management to provide an assessment about the 
effectiveness of the internal control system over financial reporting, while Section 
404(b) requires auditor attestation of internal controls. Section 404 has met with 
significant opposition from the SEC registrants and the business community; 
conversely, investors and auditors have been very supportive of the requirements of 
Section 404 of SOX (Ernst & Young 2005; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005).  
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SOX also recognized the need for timely financial reporting. Section 409 of 
SOX authorized the SEC to require its registrants to disclose financial and other 
important information rapidly. Specifically, Section 409 states: 
"(l) Real Time Issuer Disclosures.--Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) 
or 15(d) shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional 
information concerning material changes in the financial condition or 
operations of the issuer, in plain English, which may include trend and 
qualitative information and graphic presentations, as the Commission 
determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in 
the public interest.". 
 
 Subsequently, the SEC sought to speed-up the financial reporting process by 
registrants. Prior to SOX, the SEC required registrants to file their annual and 
quarterly reports with the SEC within 90 and 45 days of the end of the fiscal year and 
quarter, respectively. In a series of actions after SOX, the SEC has speeded up the 
financial reporting process by reducing the time lag from the end of the fiscal year / 
quarter within which the relevant annual or quarterly report has to be filed with the 
Commission. Thus, the SEC now requires all large-accelerated filers (companies with 
public float of $700 million or more) to file their annual report within 60 days of the 
fiscal year end on or after December 2006; the corresponding deadline for other 
accelerated filers (companies with public float between $75 million and $700 million) 
is 75 days from the fiscal year end. While initially the SEC sought to have a shortened 
reporting lag for non-accelerated filers also, the SEC later relented and has left 
unchanged the deadline for filing by non-accelerated filers. Hence, non-accelerated 
filers (less than $75 million in public float) continue to have a 90 day deadline to file 
their annual reports with the SEC (SEC 2005).   
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 In the second part of my dissertation, I examine the association between 
internal control reporting and audit reporting lag. Consistent with the approach used in 
prior studies, I use audit reporting lag as a proxy for the overall financial reporting lag. 
I hypothesize that the audit reporting lag would be greater for firms reporting a 
material weakness in internal control. Further, I focus on non-accelerated filer firms 
and examine the extent to which poor quality internal controls differentially impact the 
audit reporting lag for such firms when compared to accelerated filer firms. As with 
the first part of the dissertation, I also examine the consequences of remediating 
previously disclosed material weaknesses in internal control on audit reporting lag in 
the year of remediation. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Prior research relating to Audit Report Lag 
Ashton et al. (1987) use survey data collected from the clients of Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Using a sample of 488 randomly selected clients in six 
industries (manufacturing, merchandising, oil & gas, commercial banks, savings and 
loans and mutual savings banks, and insurance) the authors find, in their univariate 
analysis, that firms that received qualified audit opinion and had poorer internal 
controls (as judged by the auditors) faced longer audit report lags as compared to firms 
that did not have such issues.  
Using a sample of 465 companies listed on Toronto Stock Exchange from 
1977 to 1982 Ashton et al. (1989) find that total assets of the client and the size of 
company’s auditors were inversely related to audit delay. Financial services 
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companies had shorter audit delays than companies in other industries. Companies 
with negative net incomes had longer audit delays than companies with positive or 
zero net incomes.  
 Bamber et al. (1993) investigate the factors that determine audit report lag 
using data from 972 firms in seven industries. The authors use a model based on (1) 
the amount of audit work required, (2) incentives to provide timely report, and (3) the 
extent to which the auditor employs a structured audit approach. The results suggest 
that audit report lag increases with auditor business risk, audit complexity and other 
risk related factors such as loss and qualified opinions. The audit report lag decreases 
as incentives increase to provide the client with timelier audit report. Finally, audit 
report lag is longer for clients of structured audit firms than for clients of unstructured 
audit firms.  
Schwartz and Soo (1996) examine audit report lags and earnings 
announcement lags for firms that switch auditors. The authors investigate whether 
audit report and earnings announcement lags are associated with the timing of auditor 
changes in relation to firms’ fiscal year-ends. The results indicate that both audit 
report and earnings announcement lags decrease (increase) for firms that change their 
auditor early (late) in the fiscal year. This study contributes to the literature by 
demonstrating that the timing of auditor changes can provide insight into causes and 
consequences of auditor switching.  
Knechel and Payne (2001) use a propriety database containing 226 audit 
engagements, for fiscal year 1991, from international public accounting firms and 
examine factors that influence audit report lag. Their results indicate that incremental 
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audit effort, the presence of tax issues and the use of less experienced audit staff are 
positively correlated with audit report lag. Interestingly, audit report lag decreased due 
to synergic relationship between non-audit services and audit services.  
Krishnan and Yang (2009) examine (a) the audit report lag and, (b) the 
earnings announcement lag. The authors use a longitudinal sample from 2001 to 2006, 
with a sample of 1,077 firms in each year. Results indicate that audit report lag 
increased significantly from 2001 to 2006, but the increase was higher during the 
2004-2006 period when SOX was in effect. Recently, Tanyi et al. (2010) examine 
audit reporting lags following voluntary and involuntary auditor changes. Tanyi et al. 
(2010) find that audit report lag is significantly higher for former Andersen clients that 
did not follow their Andersen partners to the new audit firm versus those clients that 
switched from another (non-Andersen) Big 5 auditor.  
 
Prior research relating to Audit Lag and SOX 
 One previous study that looks at the impact of SOX Section 404 opinions on 
audit reporting lag in the post-SOX period is Ettredge et al. (2006); the authors 
analyze the impact of internal control quality on audit delay following the 
implementation of SOX. Using a sample of 2,344 companies for fiscal years 2003 and 
2004, the authors find that the presence of material weaknesses in internal controls is 
associated with longer delays. Further, they also find that compared to specific 
material weaknesses, general (systemic) material weaknesses are associated with 
longer delays. However, Ettredge et al. (2006) examine only accelerated filers; further, 
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their sample stops with fiscal year 2004, which is the first year of reporting under 
SOX Section 404. 
 In the second part of my dissertation, I investigate the association between 
material weaknesses in internal control and audit report lag for non-accelerated filers. I 
then examine how such association differs for non-accelerated filers and accelerated 
filers.  
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 I expect differences between the accelerated and non-accelerated in terms of 
the effect of internal control problems on audit reporting lag for the following reasons. 
First, accelerated filers are subject to both Section 404(a) (which requires 
management’s assertion on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial 
reporting) and 404(b) (auditors’ assessment of internal controls). In contrast, non-
accelerated filers are required to follow only Section 404(a). In other words the 
responsibility with respect to internal control evaluation in case of the non-accelerated 
filers is lower for the auditors as compared to those for the accelerated filers. Second, 
both anecdotal evidence and prior studies have consistently shown that smaller firms 
typically have lower quality internal controls. As such, auditors rely on internal 
controls to a lesser extent in the case of non-accelerated filers than in the case of 
accelerated filers. This in turn implies that the effect of having a material weakness in 
internal controls should be lower for non-accelerated filers than for accelerated filers. 
This leads to my third hypothesis: 
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H3:  The audit report lag associated with material weaknesses in internal control 
is shorter for non-accelerated filers than for accelerated filers.  
  
As with audit fees, I also examine the impact of remediation of previously 
disclosed material weaknesses in internal control on audit report lag. While some audit 
fee studies, as discussed in the prior chapter, have examined the effects of remediation 
on audit fees no prior study has examined the effects of remediation on audit reporting 
lag. As with audit fees, I expect differences between the accelerated and non-
accelerated filers in terms of the impact of remediation of previously disclosed internal 
control problems on audit reporting lag. My fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4:  The effects of remediating previously disclosed internal control weaknesses 
on audit reporting lag are lower for non-accelerated filers than for 
accelerated filers. 
 
METHOD 
I use the following regression model to test my hypothesis: 
 REP_LAG = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + b3*HIGROWTH + b4*HILITIG + b5*ROA+ 
b6*DA + b7*LOSS + b8*RESTAT + b9*AFEE + b10*AUOP + b11*GC + 
b12*XDOPS + b13*INITIAL + b14MW + error 
The variables are defined as follows: 
REP_LAG = number of days between fiscal year-end and date of the audit report;                    
LNTA  = natural log of client’s total assets; 
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SQSEG  = square root of the number of segments; 
HITECH = 1 if the firm belongs to high-tech industries (three-digit SIC codes 
                283,284, 357, 366,    367, 371, 382, 384, and 737), else 0;  
ROA  = return on assets (operating income divided by total assets); 
DA  = total debt divided by total assets; 
LOSS  = 1 if the firm reports a loss before extraordinary items, else 0; 
RESTAT = 1 if the firm restated its financial reports in the current year, else 0; 
AFEE  = total audit fees divided by total assets; 
AUOP  = 1 if the firm receives modified auditor’s opinion other than going concern, 
                              else 0; 
GC  = 1 if audit opinion modified for going concern, else 0; 
XDOPS  = 1 if the firm has extraordinary items on its financial statement, else 0;  
INITIAL = 1 if the audit engagement is in their first year, else 0. 
MW  = 1 if material weakness in internal control, else 0. 
All of the control variables are derived from prior studies (Ettredge et al. 2006; 
Krishnan and Yang 2009; Tanyi el al. 2010) and the variables are measured as of the 
relevant fiscal year ends. I use LNTA as control variable to proxy for size, for 
complexity I use SQSEG, for client industry I use HITECH, for financial condition I 
use ROA, DA, LOSS, RESTAT, AUOP and GC, for auditor type I use AFEE and 
INITIAL and a special variable XDOPS. I winsorize ROA and DA at absolute values of 
10 and other continuous variables at the 1st and the 99th percentiles.  
 As with the audit fee analysis in the earlier chapter, as part of additional 
analyses, I divide material weakness in internal control into the following types: 
Systemic internal control weaknesses (SMW) and Account Specific internal control 
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weaknesses (AMW).  As discussed earlier, systemic problems are more difficult to 
audit around, so the effect on audit reporting lag should be higher for systemic internal 
control problems than for account-specific problems. 
For the second part of my dissertation, I use the same sample size as in the first 
part of the dissertation, which examines audit fees. Hence, I do not repeat the sample 
selection procedure here. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 Table 2 also provides descriptive data about the variables in the audit reporting 
lag model for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, for accelerated and non-accelerated filers. 
The data is partitioned by internal control opinion type.  For both years, firms with 
material weaknesses (both accelerated and non-accelerated filers) are smaller in size 
(measured by LNTA).  For both fiscal years 2008 and 2009 the mean audit report lag, 
measured by REP_LAG, is higher for firms with material weaknesses as compared to 
firms that do not have such disclosures.  In the case of accelerated filers, the mean 
REP_LAG for firms with material weaknesses in 2008 (2009) is 86.86 (76.86) as 
compared to 62.44 (61.69) for firms with no such disclosures; in the case of non-
accelerated filers, the mean REP_LAG for firms with material weaknesses for fiscal 
2008 (2009) is 99.79 (98.69) as compared to 82.78 (83.00) for firms with a clean 
internal control report.  
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 Other significant differences between firms with and without weaknesses (for 
both the accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers) are that firms with material 
weaknesses have lower return on assets, have more firms that had losses in their 
operations (LOSS), and have more frequent restatements (RESTAT). The results also 
show that firms with material weaknesses are less likely to have Big4 as their auditors 
measured by BIG4, are more likely to have a modified opinion (expect for accelerated 
filers in fiscal 2009), more likely to have a going concern modified audit opinion and 
more likely to be in the initial years of audit engagement. 
 
Regression Results 
 Similar to part I of my dissertation, for my regression analysis I use four 
different sample sizes. First I run the main analysis for both fiscal year 2008 and 2009 
using the full sample of 2,839 observations – divided into all accelerated filers and 
non-accelerated filers. I then use a sub-sample of firms by taking only those 
accelerated filers that are not classified as large-accelerated filers in the Audit 
Analytics database; I then compare such firms with non-accelerated filers. The sample 
size for this analysis is 1,801 for 2008 and 1,812 for 2009. Next, I further restrict the 
sample to only those observations that are common in both years; this yields a sample 
size of 1,657 each for 2008 and 2009. Finally, for sensitivity analysis, I restrict the 
sample to only those observations that have the same filing status in both years – i.e. a 
firm should have filed as accelerated filer in both years or as non-accelerated filer in 
both years.   
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Impact of Material Weakness on Audit Report Lag (H3) 
Table 14 shows the results for the first regression for the full sample with MW 
as the variable of interest. Each regression, for both accelerated and non-accelerated 
filers, is significant and the models explain between 21 and 27 percent of the variation 
in audit report lag. Control variables – LNTA, LOSS and GC are significant in both 
2008 and 2009 for accelerated and non-accelerated filers. LNTA is negatively 
significant whereas LOSS and GC are positively significant. The above results indicate 
that larger firms have shorter audit report lag and firms with poor financial conditions, 
measured by LOSS and GC, have longer audit report lag.   
SQSEG is positively significant only in 2008 for both, accelerated and non-
accelerated filers; this suggests that firms with complex accounting have longer audit 
report lag. HITECH, ROA, DA and INITIAL are significant in both years (2008 and 
2009) only for non-accelerated filers; these variables are not significant in 2008 for 
accelerated filers. HITECH is negatively significant indicating that firms that belong 
to high-tech industries have shorter audit report lag. ROA, DA and INITIAL are 
positively significant, which means that firms with higher return on assets have longer 
audit report lag. Also, firms with higher debt-to-asset ratio have longer audit report 
lag. Firms that switch auditors have longer audit report lag as compared to firms that 
do not switch auditors during the year. 
AUOP is negatively significant in both years for accelerated filers only; AUOP 
is not significant for non-accelerated filers in 2009; this indicates that firms that the 
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firms that receive modified auditor’s opinion other than going concern have shorter 
audit report lag. Other control variables – RESTAT and AUFEE are not significant, 
except RESTAT is negatively significant in 2009 for accelerated filers and AFEE is 
negatively significant in 2008 for non-accelerated filers. Finally, XDOPS is negatively 
significant for accelerated filers in 2008 and positively significant for non-accelerated 
filers in 2009.  
 The regression results for fiscal year 2008 show that the coefficient of MW is 
positive and significant in both the accelerated and non-accelerated filer samples.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient is 20.02 for accelerated filers and 10.47 for the non-
accelerated filers, indicating that accelerated (non-accelerated) firms with material 
weakness in their internal control reporting face an audit report lag that is higher by 
20.02 (10.47) days compared to firms without such material weaknesses in internal 
controls. Next,  I run the same regressions for fiscal year 2009. In such regressions, 
once again the MW coefficient is positive and significant. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients are 10.49 and 9.92 for accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers, 
respectively.  These results show that firms with material weakness disclosures have 
longer audit report lag as compared to firms that do not have such disclosures.8  
 I then compare the change in the magnitude of the MW coefficient from 2008 
to 2009 for the accelerated and non-accelerated filers. Tests of comparisons of the MW 
coefficients indicate that there is significant decline from fiscal 2008 to 2009 in the 
                                                 
8 I further perform similar regression analysis as in Table 14; I use SQLAG (square root of audit report 
lag) as my dependent variable instead of REP_LAG. The results indicate that firms with material 
weaknesses have longer audit report lag as compared to firms with clean internal control opinions. The 
MW coefficients for 2008 and 2009 for accelerated (non-accelerated) filers are 1.04 (0.53) and 0.60 
(0.52), respectively.  
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MW coefficient for the accelerated filers; in contrast, the change in the coefficient 
value from 2008 to 2009 is not statistically significant for the non-accelerated filers.  
 As part of my additional analyses, I divide material weakness in internal 
control into types of internal control weaknesses, namely, Systemic internal control 
weaknesses (SMW) and Account Specific internal control weaknesses (AMW).  
 The results in Table 15 are mixed; the results show that for accelerated filers in 
fiscal 2008 the coefficient of AMW and SMW are 19.26 (p < .01) and 21.19 (p < .01), 
respectively; the difference in magnitude between the two coefficients is not 
statistically significant. For non-accelerated filers the coefficients of SMW and AMW 
are 10.64 (p < .01) and 9.56 (p < .01); here again, the difference is not statistically 
significant.  
 For fiscal 2009 the results indicate that for accelerated filers the impact of 
SMW is much higher as compared to AMW; the coefficient for SMW and AMW are 
15.85 (p < .01) and 4.08 (p = .04), respectively; on the other hand for the non-
accelerated filers the impact of AMW is higher as compared to SMW (12.19 days 
versus, 9.37 days). 
 Overall, the results suggest that the impact of having a material weakness in 
internal controls have a higher impact on accelerated filers as compared to non-
accelerated filers. The results also indicate a decline in the impact of material 
weaknesses in internal controls on the audit report lag, for the accelerated filers.  
 
Results for sub-sample (non-large accelerated filers) 
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 I run similar regressions as in Table 14 for my sub-sample consisting of only 
non-large accelerated filers. The results of such regressions are presented in Tables 18 
and 19. As mentioned in the prior chapter, for this sub-sample, I use firms that are 
classified as accelerated filers other than large-accelerated filers.   
 The results in Table 18 are consistent with the results presented for the full 
sample. The regressions are significant with adjusted R-square between 10 and 27 
percent. The results show that audit report lag for firms with material weaknesses 
declines over time for the non-large accelerated filers. The coefficient for fiscal 2008 
(2009) for non-large accelerated filer is 21.24 (10.84); both values are significant, and 
the decline from 2008 to 2009 also is significant. 
 In Table 19, I further restrict the sample size to those firms that are common in 
both 2008 and 2009. The results with this sub-sample also confirm the results 
presented in the main analysis (and the analysis in Table 18). The coefficients indicate 
that for firms with a material weakness in internal controls the audit report lag is 
higher by 20.70 and 8.88 days in 2008 and 2009, respectively, for the non-large 
accelerated filers; both values are significant, and the decline from 2008 to 2009 also 
is significant. 
In summary, the results provide support to my first hypothesis that the audit 
report lag associated with material weaknesses in internal control is shorter for non-
accelerated filers than for accelerated filers in 2008. However, the differences between 
the two groups of firms are not significant in 2009. 
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Impact of Remediation on audit report lag (H4) 
 Hypothesis four examines the effects of remediation of previously disclosed 
material weaknesses in internal control on the audit report lag. I examine the effects of 
remediation by comparing firms that remediated previously disclosed problems 
against firms without problems.  
. Table 16 presents the results of remediation for both accelerated filers and non-
accelerated filers, as well as the overall combined sample. I include the MW_08 
variable (material weakness in 2008) in the 2009 regression to measure the impact of 
having a material weakness in 2008 in the fiscal year 2009, i.e. measure the impact on 
audit report lag in the year of remediation.  
Each of the regressions is significant (p < .01), with adjusted R-squares 
between 18 and 39 percent. The results indicate that the accelerated and non-
accelerated filers continue to face longer audit report lag in the year of remediation 
compared to firms with clean internal control opinions in both fiscal 2008 and 2009. 
The coefficient for MW_08 for accelerated (non-accelerated) filers is 3.87 (7.06), both 
significant at (p < .01).  
 The above results raise the following question: does remediation result in any 
reduction in audit report lag for the accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers? For 
such analyses, I only use those firms that have material weaknesses in 2008. The 
results are presented in Table 17 and REMEDIATE is the variable of interest. There 
are 243 firms that had material weaknesses in fiscal 2008, of which 113 remediated in 
fiscal 2009 and 130 continued to have material weaknesses. The coefficient of 
REMEDIATE for accelerated (non-accelerated) filers is -9.71 (-4.67), both coefficients 
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are significant.  The results indicate the remediation of internal control weaknesses 
leads to a reduction of 9.71 (4.67) days for the accelerated (non-accelerated) filers. 
 
Results for sub-sample of non-large accelerated filers 
 Similar to Table 16 and Table 17, I run regressions with the sub-sample of 
firms that exclude large-accelerated filers. Since I am measuring the impact of 
remediation over two years I only run regressions for firms that are common in both 
years. Table 20 presents the results for regressions similar to those in Table 16. To 
measure the impact on audit report lag in the year of remediation I include MW_08 in 
the 2009 regression for the sub-sample of firms without large-accelerated filers. The 
results in Table 20 are consistent with those in Table 16; the results show that for both 
the non-large accelerated and non-accelerated filers, the coefficient of MW_08 is 
positive and significant. The coefficient for non-large accelerated filer is 4.54 (p = .02) 
and non-accelerated filers is 7.59 (p < .01). 
 Similarly the results in Table 21 are consistent with those in Table 17, 
indicating that both non-large accelerated and non-accelerated filers see a reduction in 
audit report lag in the year of remediation. The coefficient of REMEDIATE is -12.72 
(p < .01) for non-large accelerated filers and -4.23 (p = .08) for the non-accelerated 
filers.  
  
Sensitivity Analysis: Firms that have the same filer status 
 I then examine the sub-sample of firms that had the same filer status in both 
fiscal 2008 and 2009. I restrict the sample to non-large accelerated filers and non-
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accelerated filers. I then delete all those observations that switched filer status, either 
from accelerated to non-accelerated or vise-versa. First, I run regressions similar to 
those in Table 19. The results in Table 22 show a similar pattern as in Table 19; the 
results indicate that the impact on audit report lag due to presence of material 
weaknesses in internal controls is higher for non-large accelerated filers as compared 
to non-accelerated filers. The results also show that the effect of having a material 
weakness in internal controls on audit report lag is much smaller in 2009 than in 2008 
for the non-large accelerated filers.  
 Table 23 confirms the results presented in Table 20, indicating that both the 
non-large accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers continue to have longer audit 
report in the year of remediation. Finally, the results in Table 24 are similar to those in 
Table 21; the results indicate that the coefficient of REMEDIATE is larger for the non-
large accelerated filers than for non-accelerated filers (-12.83 for the non-large 
accelerated filers versus -3.06 for the non-accelerated filers). 
 Overall, the results indicate that non-accelerated firms that, in 2009, remediate 
previously (i.e., in 2008) disclosed material weaknesses in internal control have a 
significant reduction in audit reporting lag compared to firms that did not remediate 
their material weaknesses. However, such remediating firms continue to have higher 
audit reporting lag when compared to firms that had a clean internal control report in 
both 2008 and 2009.  Further, the effects of remediation differ for accelerated and 
non-accelerated firms. 
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SUMMARY  
In the second part of my dissertation I examine the association between 
presence of material weaknesses in internal controls and audit report lag, measured by 
number of days between fiscal year-end and date of the audit report.  The results show 
that firms with material weaknesses in internal control under Section 404 face longer 
audit report lag as compared to firms that do not have such disclosures. More 
importantly, the effect of having material weaknesses in internal control on the audit 
report lag is significantly smaller for non-accelerated firms than for accelerated firms 
in 2008. This finding is consistent with the position that auditors rely on internal 
controls to a much smaller extent in the context of auditing non-accelerated filers; if 
the reliance on internal controls is in general low, then the penalties associated with 
having material weaknesses will also be lower. 
The regression results also indicate that there is a sharp decline in value of the 
MW coefficient from 2008 to 2009 for the accelerated filers, but not for the non-
accelerated filers. The decline is such that by 2009 there is no statistically (or 
practically) significant difference in the penalty, in the form of additional audit report 
lag, for accelerated and non-accelerated firms disclosing material weaknesses in 
internal control.  
The results also indicate that both the accelerated and non-accelerated filers, 
firms that remediate face longer audit report lag as compared to firms with clean 
internal control reports in both 2008 and 2009.  
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IV. EARLY WARNINGS OF INTERNAL CONTROL PROBLEMS BY NON-
ACCELERATED FILERS 
 
 The Enron and WorldCom failures, in late 2001 and early 2002, gave rise to 
concerns to the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting, and 
ultimately resulted in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) in July 
2002. As noted in the earlier chapters, parts A and B of Section 404 of SOX required 
reporting on internal control by management and attestation of such reports by 
auditors, respectively.  
 Another section of SOX dealt with “disclosure controls.” Specifically, Section 
302 of SOX requires the SEC to enact rules that require the “principal executive 
officer or officers and the principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing 
similar functions” to certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted with 
the SEC that the officer has reviewed the report and that based on the officer's 
knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit 
to state a material fact. More importantly, the signing officers have to acknowledge 
that they (a) are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls; (b) 
have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the 
issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers by others 
within those entities, (c) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's internal 
controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report; and (d) have presented in the 
report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on their 
evaluation as of that date. Section 302 also requires that the SEC rules specify that the 
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signing officers have disclosed to the issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the 
board of directors (a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal 
controls data and (b) any fraud that involves management or other employees who 
have a significant role in the issuer's internal controls; and that the signing officers 
have indicated in the report whether or not there were significant changes in internal 
controls. 
 The SEC’s  (2003b) rules related to the implementation of Section 302 require 
the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of the registrant to certify 
as follows: 
I, [identify the certifying individual], certify that:  
1. I have reviewed this [specify report] of [identify registrant];  
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make 
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements 
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial 
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the 
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, 
and for, the periods presented in this report;  
4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for 
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in 
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over 
financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) 
for the registrant and have:  
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such 
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to 
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its 
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, 
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  
(b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such 
internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, 
to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting 
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles;  
(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and 
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness 
53 
 
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered 
by this report based on such evaluation; and  
(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over 
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal 
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) 
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the 
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and  
5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based 
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the 
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of 
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or 
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably 
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize 
and report financial information; and  
(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other 
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over 
financial reporting. 
 
 There are differences of opinion, among academics and others, about the extent 
of overlap between Sections 302 and 404. The SEC also notes that there is substantial 
overlap between Sections 302 and 404 of SOX. Specifically, the SEC notes as follows: 
“While there is substantial overlap between a company's disclosure controls 
and procedures and its internal control over financial reporting, there are both 
some elements of disclosure controls and procedures that are not subsumed by 
internal control over financial reporting and some elements of internal control 
that are not subsumed by the definition of disclosure controls and procedures. 
... 
 
“We agree that some components of internal control over financial reporting 
will be included in disclosure controls and procedures for all companies. In 
particular, disclosure controls and procedures will include those components of 
internal control over financial reporting that provide reasonable assurances that 
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial 
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.  
However, in designing their disclosure controls and procedures, companies can 
be expected to make judgments regarding the processes on which they will rely 
to meet applicable requirements. In doing so, some companies might design 
their disclosure controls and procedures so that certain components of internal 
control over financial reporting pertaining to the accurate recording of 
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transactions and disposition of assets or to the safeguarding of assets are not 
included.  
 
“For example, a company might have developed internal control over financial 
reporting that includes as a component of safeguarding of assets dual signature 
requirements or limitations on signature authority on checks. That company 
could nonetheless determine that this component is not part of disclosure 
controls and procedures. We therefore believe that while there is substantial 
overlap between internal control over financial reporting and disclosure 
controls and procedures, many companies will design their disclosure controls 
and procedures so that they do not include all components of internal control 
over financial reporting.” 
 
Some academics and practitioners, including a former SEC chief accountant, 
view the rules relating to Section 302 as requiring prior disclosure about internal 
control problems in Section 302 filings before such problems are disclosed as material 
weaknesses in internal control in Section 404 filings. Both sections 302 and 404 of 
SOX introduce new disclosures related to controls.  Section 302 requires management 
attestation about disclosure controls in quarterly and annual filings, while section 404 
requires management to attest about internal controls over financial reporting in 
annual filings. In addition, section 302 requires management public disclosure of any 
changes in internal controls over financial reporting, while Section 404 requires 
public disclosure of the evaluation as of the fiscal year end.  Finally, while there is 
direct auditor involvement in 404 related disclosures the auditor’s involvement in 
section 302 disclosures is only indirect. 
 There are numerous instances where SEC registrants have filed clean 302 
reports prior to filing adverse 404 reports. Hermanson and Ye (2009) using data for 
firms with fiscal year ending between November 15, 2004 and November 14, 2005, 
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find that only 27 percent of the accelerated filers provided prior warnings of any 
internal control weaknesses during the year under Section 302.  
 Given such controversy related to prior warnings about internal control 
problems disclosed in Section 404 filings, it is important to examine the characteristics 
of firms that do or do not disclose such internal control problems early, as well as the 
consequences associated with the lack of such early warnings. The third part of my 
dissertation examines prior warnings by firms that disclosed material weaknesses in 
internal controls in 2007, 2008 and 2009.  Specifically, I examine the characteristics of 
those firms that make prior disclosures, pursuant to Section 302 of SOX, of material 
weaknesses that subsequently led to adverse Section 404 disclosures. I examine the 
propensity of both accelerated and non-accelerated filers to make such prior Section 
302 disclosures. In addition, I also examine if such firms were subject to SEC actions 
in the form of comment letters from regulators requiring registrants to amend 
previously filed financial statements. 
 
Section 302 versus Section 404 
 Before Section 404 was enacted, Section 302 was put in place on August 29, 
2002. Unlike Section 404, which is an annual requirement, Section 302 is a quarterly 
requirement for the CEO and CFO of the company about the effectiveness of internal 
controls over financial reporting. Section 302 addresses disclosure controls and 
procedures. Section 404 on became applicable for accelerated filers for fiscal years 
starting on or after November 15, 2004. Section 404(a) of SOX requires management 
to provide an assessment about the effectiveness of the internal control system over 
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financial reporting, and became applicable for non-accelerated filers for fiscal years 
ending on or after December 15, 2007. The SEC (2003) claims that “there is a 
substantial overlap between internal control over financial reporting (Section 404) and 
disclosure controls (Section 302) and procedures.”  
 Despite the clear definition by the SEC regarding Section 302 about internal 
control weaknesses most companies were not clear on its implementation and it was 
evident in the first year of Section 404 implementation. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007 
state that “neither SEC nor SOX Section 302 specify particular procedures to be 
applied by management in evaluating internal controls nor do they require independent 
audits of internal controls”. Hence, most accelerated filers deferred reporting internal 
control weaknesses until required under Section 404. This is more evident from the 
fact that only 27 percent of the accelerated filers reported internal control weaknesses 
under Section 302 in the initial year of Section 404 (Hermanson and Ye 2009).  
 As noted in prior chapters, non-accelerated filers are not required to follow 
Section 404(b); after multiple extensions by the SEC, in July 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) was enacted that permanently 
exempts non-accelerated filers from following Section 404(b) of SOX. Hence the 
involvement of the auditors’ in reporting material weaknesses in internal control is 
minimal.     
  
Prior research  
 Using a sample of 261 companies that disclosed at least one material weakness 
in internal control under Section 302, Ge and McVay (2005), find disclosures of 
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material weaknesses under Section 302 to be positively related to company complexity 
and negatively related to company size and profitability. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2007) examine internal control deficiency disclosure prior to the implementation of 
Section 404. They find (using a sample of 326 firms between November 2003 and 
December 2004) that relative to non-disclosers firms disclosing internal control 
deficiencies have more complex operations, recent organizational changes, greater 
accounting risk, more auditor resignations and fewer resources available for internal 
control.  
 One prior published study has examined factors associated with prior Section 
302 disclosures by firms that subsequently disclosed material internal control 
weaknesses in their Section 404 reports. Hermanson and Ye (2009) examine firms 
with fiscal year ending between November 15, 2004 and November 14, 2005; by 
construction, their sample is limited to accelerated filers. Their sample includes 451 
accelerated filers that reported material weaknesses in internal controls. These authors 
find that early warnings in Section 302 quarterly filings are positively associated with 
certain firm characteristics such as the number of material weaknesses, severity of 
material weakness, prior earnings restatements, auditor independence, CFO change, 
and number of audit committee meetings. In addition, Hermanson and Ye (2009) find 
that prior disclosures are less likely when there is future equity financing and CEO/ 
board chair duality.   
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 Empirical evidence in Hermanson and Ye (2009) indicates that many 
registrants that disclosed internal control weaknesses pursuant to Section 404 had still 
issued clean Section 302 reports in the immediately preceding quarterly statements. 
The sample in Hermanson and Ye (2009) includes only accelerated filers.  
 After the enactment of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (2010), non-accelerated filers are exempted from following Section 
404(b) of SOX. Hence, the involvement of the external auditors in the internal control 
evaluation process is lower for the non-accelerated filers. This in turn implies that 
non-accelerated filers may be even less likely to have early warning disclosures of 
material internal control weaknesses that are later disclosed pursuant to Section 404(a) 
reporting. Conversely, it is management that is responsible for both Section 302 and 
Section 404 reporting in the case of non-accelerated filers; that is, since it is the same 
evaluators for both Section 302 and 404 reporting it is more likely that there would be 
early warning disclosures in the case of non-accelerated filers. This argument relies on 
the assumption that in the case of accelerated filers, management may be reluctant to 
classify a weakness as material (and hence requiring disclosure) but that at the end of 
the fiscal year when the auditor makes his assessment the same problem may be 
deemed material and hence require a Section 404 disclosure. 
 In addition, the evidence in Hermanson and Ye (2009) relates to the early years 
of implementation of Section 404. As registrants’ and auditors’ experience with 
Section 404 increases, it is more likely that registrants would be able to identify 
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material weaknesses in internal control earlier, and accordingly be able to provide 
early warnings of internal control problems in the form of Section 302 disclosures.  
 Thus, arguments can be made on either side of the issue in this instance. 
Ultimately, the issue is empirical and I provide some relevant empirical evidence on 
this important issue. Hence, I frame the hypothesis in the null form: 
 
H5:  Early warning of material internal control weaknesses, in the form of prior 
Section 302 disclosures, are equally likely for non-accelerated filers and 
accelerated filers.  
 
 In addition, I also examine the factors associated with the early warning 
disclosures. As in Hermanson and Ye (2009), I expect that executive, and audit 
committee characteristics would be associated with the early warning disclosures. 
Specifically, I expect that that recently appointed top executives have greater 
incentives to make disclosures about internal control, since they would be less likely 
to be personally blamed for having tolerated such weaknesses; in addition, it is easier 
to shift the blame on predecessors. As in Hermanson and Ye (2009), I expect that audit 
committee characteristics will be associated with the likelihood of early warning 
disclosures. A long line of research in auditing shows that audit committees that (a) 
have a greater number of accounting and auditing experts, and/or (b) are more diligent, 
are associated with a variety of positive outcomes related to the financial reporting 
process (Abbott et al. 2004; Carcello and Neal 2003; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). 
Consistent with such research, I expect that prior Section 302 warnings, for companies 
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that subsequently disclose problems pursuant to Section 404 reports, would be more 
likely when the audit committee of a company has more (a) accounting and auditing 
experts, and (b) frequent audit committee meetings.   Thus, my sixth hypothesis is: 
 
H6:  Early warning of material internal control weaknesses, in the form of prior 
Section 302 disclosures, are more likely for companies that  
 (a) have a new CEO or CFO, and  
(b) have audit committees that have (i) accounting and auditing experts and 
(ii) more frequent meetings. 
 
METHOD 
 I use the following logistic regression: 
PRIOR_302   = b0 + b1*AUFEE + b2*LNTA + b3*INITIAL + b4*BIG4 + b5*RESTAT + 
b6*LITIG + b7*GC + b8*DNASR + b9*EQUIFIN +b10*CEO_CHR + 
b11*SQ_CFO_TEN + b12*CEO_CHG + b13*NUM_AC_MEM + 
b14*PROP_EXPT + b15*AC_MEET + b16*LOG_NUM_WK + b17*SMW + 
error 
The variables are defined as follows: 
PRIOR_302  = 1 if one or more internal control weaknesses disclosed during 
the fiscal year prior to Section 404 reporting by external  
auditor(s), else 0; 
AUFEE  = audit fees scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year;  
LNTA   = natural log of client’s total assets; 
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INITIAL  = 1 if the audit engagement is in their first year, else 0;                        
BIG4   = 1 if Big 4 auditor, else 0; 
RESTAT  = 1 if a firm restated their financial statements, else 0; 
LITIG  = 1 if the company is in a litigious industry: SIC codes  
                                        2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 
                                        7370-7374, and 8731-8734, else 0; 
GC    = 1 if audit opinion modified for going concern, else 0;  
DNASR  = 1 if the nonaudit fee ratio (the sum of tax fees and other fees 
divided by the sum of audit fees and audit-related fees) is                                  
above the sample median, else 0;  
EQUIFIN  = 1 if the company’s equity issuance is greater than 10 percent 
                                        of its total assets in the next fiscal year, else 0; 
CEO_CHR  = 1 if the CEO also serves as chairman of the board, else 0; 
SQ_CFO_TEN = square root of number of years of a CFO with a firm; 
CEO_CHG  = for firms with Prior 302 disclosure = 0, 1 if the tenure of the 
                                       CEO at the fiscal year-end is no greater than one year, else 0. 
                                       For firms with Prior 302 disclosure=1, 1 if the tenure of the   
                           CEO on the earliest Section 302 disclosure date in the fiscal 
                           year is no greater than one year by that time, else 0; 
NUM_AC_MEM  = number of audit committee members; 
PROP_EXPT   = proportion of audit committee members with accounting 
                                       expertise; 
AC_MEET  = number of audit committee meetings held in the fiscal year;                      
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LOG_NUM_WK = log of number of material weaknesses; 
SMW   = 1 if a firm reported system internal control weaknesses in 
                                       internal control, else 0. 
. 
The model above is similar to that in Hermanson and Ye (2009). Auditor 
related variables are AUFEE, DNASR, INITIAL and BIG4. Company characteristics 
are measured by LNTA, RESTAT, LITIG, GC, and EQUIFIN; executive and audit 
committee characteristics by CEO_CHR, SQ_CFO_TEN, CEO_CHG, 
NUM_AC_MEM, PROP_EXPT and AC_MEET. Internal control problems are 
measured using LOG_NUM_WK and SMW. 
  
SAMPLE 
 I obtain information regarding audit fees and audit related variables from the 
Audit Analytics database.9 In Panels A of Table 25, I present my data selection 
process for fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
 For fiscal year 2007 I start with 9,704 firms with a management report on 
internal controls.10 I then delete firms as follows: foreign firms (n = 1,525); firms in 
financial industry (SIC 60-67) (n = 2099); duplicate observations (n = 95). This 
process yields 5,895 observations with management reports. I then obtain observations 
                                                 
9 I use the year of Section 404 filing opinion available in the Audit Analytics database.  
 
10 I classify a firm as an accelerated filer if it had both management and auditors report, as it signifies 
that that firm followed both Section 404(a) and 404(b) of SOX. I classify any firm that had only 
managements report as non-accelerated filers, as it signifies that that firm only followed Section 404(a) 
of SOX. 
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that have both management and auditor’s report on internal controls. For fiscal year 
2007 there are 4,615 observations with both management and auditors report. I follow 
the same process for deleting firms as before; I delete 681 foreign firms, 981 
observations that belong to the financial industry, and 23 duplicate observations.  
 This process leaves me with 2,930 observations that have both management 
and auditor’s reports and 3,055 (5985 – 2930) observations with only management 
reports. I then delete 1,595 observations that have a fiscal year end other than between 
December 15th and February 28th of the following year. I restrict the sample to fiscal 
years staring December 15th because the non-accelerated filers were not required to 
provide management’s report on internal control over financial reporting until 
December 15th 2007. The February 29th ending is used because given the learning 
curve associated with Section 404 I did not want to treat a firm with a December 15, 
2007 fiscal year on par with a firm that has, for example, an October 31, 2008 fiscal 
year end. Finally I delete 187 observations with missing audit fee data.  
 My final sample size for fiscal year 2007 is 4,233 observations with 2,028 non-
accelerated and 2,205 accelerated filers. I follow the same process for fiscal years 
2008 and 2009.  
 In Panel B of Table 25, I divide the observations by types of internal control 
weaknesses and filer status. If a firm reported both systemic and account specific 
internal control problems, then I code that company as having a systemic problem. A 
firm coded as having only account-specific problems by definition has no systemic 
problem.  Following Munsif et al. (2011), I classify an internal control weakness as 
systemic if, per Audit Analytics, the problem was in any one or more of the following 
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categories: senior management competency, tone, reliability issues; accounting 
personnel resources, competency/training; segregations of duties/ design of controls 
(personnel); information technology, software, security & access issue; ethical or 
compliance issues with personnel; ineffective, non-existent or understaffed audit 
committee; insufficient or non-existent internal audit function; ineffective regulatory 
compliance issues. 
 For fiscal year 2007, out of 2,028 (2,205) non-accelerated (accelerated filers) 
there are 1,440 (2,039) firms without any internal control weakness disclosure, there 
are 513 (107) firms with systemic weaknesses and 75 (59) firms with account-specific 
weaknesses. Similarly, for fiscal 2008 out of 1,980 (2,161) non-accelerated 
(accelerated) filers there are 1,419 (2,060) firms with no material weakness disclosure, 
495 (64) firms with systemic weaknesses and 66 (37) firms with account-specific 
weaknesses. Finally, for fiscal year 2009, out of 1,499 (2,057) there are 1,120 (2,001) 
firms with no material weaknesses, 323 (28) firms with systemic weaknesses and 56 
(28) firms with account-specific weaknesses.  
 One striking feature from Panel B is the relatively higher proportion of 
systemic weaknesses for non-accelerated filers compared to accelerated filers, for each 
of the three years.  One inference from this evidence is that in the case of non-
accelerated filers a material weakness has to be much more severe, before 
management deems it serious enough to merit a Section 404 disclosure. In the case of 
accelerated filers, the involvement of the auditor may result in a lower threshold for an 
internal control problem to be deemed “material” and hence requiring Section 404 
disclosure. 
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 Panel C of Table 1 shows that for non-accelerated filers there were 791 firms 
that had clean opinion in both fiscal 2007 and 2008, 79 firms that had systemic 
material weaknesses in 2007 but had clean opinion in 2008, while 12 firms went from 
having systemic weakness in 2007 to having account-specific in 2008.   
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 In Panels A, B, C and D of Table 26, I present the breakdown of the sample for 
both the accelerated and non-accelerated filers by showing the number of weaknesses 
disclosed under Section 404 of SOX and firms that had prior Section 302 disclosure. 
There were some observations lost from Panel B of Table 25; this is because some 
firms did not have any prior 302 filings. In addition, observations for the multivariate 
analysis were lost due to lack of financial information in Compustat; for example, out 
of 588 non-accelerated filers’ observations for fiscal 2007 only 258 observations had 
financial data available.  
 Hermanson and Ye (2009) note that in the first year of Section 404 for the 
accelerated filers in 2004, there were only 27 percent of the companies provided early 
warnings under Section 302. Panel A of Table 26 shows that for the non-accelerated 
filers in fiscal 2007, the first year of Section 404 for the non-accelerated filers, only 15 
percent of the companies (79 out of 544) provided early warnings under Section 302. 
In the sample of accelerated filers, 44 percent of the firms that disclosed early 
warnings under Section 302 for fiscal year 2007.   
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 For fiscal years 2008 and 2009 (presented in Panels B and C of Table 26), the 
proportion of non-accelerated filers that provided early warnings under Section 302 
increases to 51 percent (274 of 539) and 65 percent, respectively.  On the other hand 
the proportion of accelerated filers disclosing early warnings is lower in 2008 and 
2009 than in 2007; the proportion is 42 percent in 2008 and 38 percent in 2009, 
although the numbers of firms with material weaknesses is lower over the latter two 
years. 
 In Panels A, B, C and D of Table 27, I provide descriptive evidence about the 
consequences associated with not providing early warnings in the form of Section 302 
disclosures. For this table, I take only those firms that reported a material weakness 
under Section 404 reporting but did not provide early warnings under Section 302. For 
this group of firms, I examine if they received an SEC Comment Letter relating to 
such non-disclosure. The source of my data is the Comment Letters section of the 
Audit Analytics database.  
 For fiscal 2007 (Panel A of Table 27), non Accelerated filers had 473 (71) 
systemic (account specific) material weaknesses; of these, with 65 (14) firms had with 
prior 302 disclosures. Of the remaining 408 (57) firms with no prior 302 disclosure, 65 
(15) received a SEC Comment Letter. Similarly, of the 103 (58) accelerated filer firms 
that had systemic (account specific) material weaknesses, 45 (25) had prior 302 
warnings (Table 26). Out of the remaining 58 (33) firms, 9 (5) firms received SEC 
comment letters.  
 Overall (presented in Panel D of Table 27), from fiscal 2007 to 2009 there are 
18 percent of non-accelerated and 22 percent accelerated filers had SEC action 
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(comment letters) against them. I further divide the sample into type of weaknesses for 
both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results show that overall 18 percent of 
firms with systemic weaknesses and 22 percent of firms with account-specific 
weaknesses received SEC action (comment letters) for both accelerated and non-
accelerated filers.   
 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Sample 
 For the regression analyses, I use data for fiscal year 2007 because, as in 
Hermanson and Ye (2009), I want to measure the impact in the first year of Section 
404 for the non-accelerated filers.  Table 28 provides descriptive evidence about the 
industry composition of my sample, for both the accelerated filers and non-accelerated 
filers. The biggest proportion of my sample, for both accelerated and non-accelerated 
filers, is from the manufacturing sector– 40 percent and 45 percent for accelerated and 
non-accelerated filers, respectively.    
In Table 29, I provide descriptive statistics for both accelerated and non-
accelerated filers; I only use those firms that had internal control weakness disclosures 
under Section 404. I lose some additional observations from my analysis at this stage 
due to missing financial information for some firms in Compustat; hence, out of 588 
non-accelerated filers’ observations for fiscal 2007 noted earlier, I have only 258 
observations for the regression analyses. 
 In Panel A of Table 29, I divide the observations, for both accelerated and 
non-accelerated filers, into firms with early warnings under Section 302 and firms 
without such warnings. In the non-accelerated filers sub-sample, significant difference 
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between the two groups (those with and without prior 302 Disclosures) are as follows: 
firms with prior disclosure have (a) lower audit fee ratio (b) larger in size,  (c) more 
likely to have a Big 4 auditor, (d) fewer going concern (GC) opinions and, (e) less 
likely to issue equity. In terms of management and audit committee characteristics, 
non-accelerated filers with prior 302 have (a) shorter CFO tenure, (b) more audit 
committee members, (c) higher proportion of audit committee members with 
accounting expertise, and (d) more audit committee meetings.  Further, non-
accelerated filers with prior 302 disclosures have (a) have more number of material 
internal control weaknesses. In the accelerated filers sub-sample, significant 
differences between firms with and without prior 302 disclosures exist in terms of the 
following variables: INITIAL, SQ_CFO_TEN, AC_MEET, LNTA and 
LOG_NUM_WK.  
 In Panel B of Table 29, I further divide the observations with prior 302 and no 
prior 302 disclosures, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers, by the type of 
internal control weaknesses (i.e., systemic or account-specific). It is noteworthy that 
the variables with significant differences between firms with and without prior 302 
disclosures vary based on the type of internal control weakness. However, given that 
there are only 7 observations that are in the non-accelerated sub-sample and disclose 
account specific weaknesses with a prior Section 302 warning, caution is warranted in 
drawing any inferences.  
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Regression Results 
Table 30 presents the results for my analysis about firms with and without a 
prior Section 302 disclosure. The regression model is derived from Hermanson and Ye 
(2009) paper. My dependent variable is PRIOR_302, coded as 1 if a firm had prior 
Section 302 disclosure during the year, else 0.  
The regression for non-accelerated filers is significant with Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square of 62.40 and Wald Chi-Square of 38.05, both significant at p < .01; the 
Max-rescaled R-Square for the model is 0.33. The results show that larger companies 
are more likely to disclose under Section 302, consistent with my univariate analysis. 
In terms of management characteristics, CFO tenure is negatively and significantly 
related to prior 302 disclosures, indicating that a new CFO would be more likely to 
have a prior warning under Section 302. In terms of corporate governance (audit 
committee) characteristics, the significant variables are NUM_AC_MEM and 
PROP_EXPT. This indicates that in the non-accelerated filers sub-sample, firms with 
greater number of audit committee members and more members with accounting 
expertise tend to provide prior warnings under Section 302. 
 The regression for the accelerated filers is significant with Likelihood Ration 
Chi-Square of 39.50 (p < .01) and Wald Chi-Square of 25.95 (p < .05); the Max-
rescaled R-Square is 0.29. Similar to non-accelerated filers, the results for accelerated 
filers indicate that larger firms tend to provide prior warnings as compared to smaller 
firms. Other variables that are significant are AUFEE and INITIAL; the coefficients of 
both these variables are positive and significant, indicating that firms that disclose 
prior 302 disclosures pay higher audit fees as compared to firms that do not disclose. 
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In addition, for the accelerated filers, clients with new auditors tend to provide prior 
warnings. The only other variable that is significant is AC_MEET with a coefficient of 
0.16 and p-value of < .01.  This means that a firm with more active audit committee, 
in terms of audit committee meetings, is more likely to disclose material internal 
control weaknesses with pursuant to Section 302 than firms with less diligent active 
audit committees. 
It is interesting to note that auditor related variables are significant in the 
accelerated filers regression, but not in the non-accelerated filers regression. This is 
consistent with the suggestion that because accelerated filers are required to comply 
with both Sections 404(a) and 404(b) (while the non-accelerated filers are not required 
to follow Section 404(b)) of SOX, the risk and responsibility for the auditor in the case 
of non-accelerated filers is significantly lower than that in the case of accelerated 
filers.    
 
SUMMARY 
 In third part of my dissertation I examine early warnings in the form of prior 
Section 302 disclosures by firms that subsequently disclosed material weaknesses in 
internal control in their Section 404 filings. I find that in fiscal 2007, only 15 percent 
of non-accelerated filers provided early warnings in the form of Section 302 
disclosures. This is significantly lower than the proportion of accelerated filers with 
prior Section 302 warnings. However, I also find that the proportions change 
dramatically in the case of non-accelerated filers; by 2008 and 2009, non-accelerated 
filers are much more likely to provide early warning disclosures in the form of Section 
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302 filings, of material internal control weaknesses that subsequently lead to adverse 
SOX 404 opinions. The results from my logistic regression analyses show that there 
are two distinct set of variables (characteristics), except for LNTA, that are associated 
with whether or not non-accelerated filers and accelerated filers provide early warning 
in the form of Section 302 disclosures.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Internal control reporting has been in the spotlight for the last decade. The fall 
of corporate giants like Enron and WorldCom and the subsequent failure of Arthur 
Andersen resulted in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) in July 
2002. Section 404 of SOX deals with internal control reporting and has two important 
paragraphs. The first paragraph, Section 404(a), requires management to provide an 
assessment about the effectiveness of the internal control system over financial 
reporting, and second paragraph, Section 404(b), requires auditor attestation of 
internal controls.  
Non-accelerated filers have been the subject of significant attention from 
legislators and regulators ever since the enactment of SOX. While the SEC granted 
numerous exemptions for non-accelerated filers from having to comply with the 
requirements of Section 404, legislators held many hearings about reducing the 
regulatory burden on such firms. Finally, Section 989G of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act provides permanent exemption from the 
requirements of Section 404(b) for non-accelerated filers.  In addition, this Act also 
requires the SEC to conduct a study to determine how the burden of complying with 
Section 404(b) can be reduced for registrants with market capitalization up to $250 
million. 
Given the above focus on internal control reporting and non-accelerated filers 
by legislators and regulators in recent years, in my dissertation I examine the internal 
control reporting by non-accelerated filers. Almost all prior research related to Section 
404 has used data from accelerated filers, and there is little prior research related to 
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non-accelerated filers.  Thus, my dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature 
on an issue of current interest to the regulators and auditing profession. 
 In the first part of my dissertation, I find that the audit fee premium for non-
accelerated filers disclosing a material weakness in internal controls (a) is significantly 
lower than the corresponding premium paid by accelerated filers, and (b) declines 
significantly over time. I also examine subsequent remediation of internal control 
problems and find that in the case of accelerated filers remediating clients pay lower 
fees compared to clients continuing to report internal control problems; however, such 
differences are not observed in the case of non-accelerated filers. 
 The second essay of my dissertation investigates the association between 
presence of material weaknesses in internal controls and audit report lag. The results 
indicate that presence of material weaknesses lead to longer audit report lag as 
compared to firms that do not have such weaknesses, for both the accelerated and non-
accelerated filers. In addition, the effect of having a material weakness on the audit 
report lag is significantly lower for non-accelerated filers than for accelerated filers in 
2008; however, the differences are not significant for fiscal year 2009. The results also 
indicate a steep fall in audit report lag in the year of remediation for accelerated filers 
as compared to non-accelerated filers.  
 The third essay of my dissertation examines early warnings, under Section 302 
disclosures, by firms that subsequently disclose material weaknesses in internal 
control. I find that only a small proportion of non-accelerated filers had such prior 
warnings in 2007; however, in 2008 and 2009 a majority of the non-accelerated filers 
with material internal control problems had prior warnings in the form of Section 302 
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disclosures. The proportion of such firms with early warnings disclosures is 
significantly higher than the proportion of accelerated filers with such early warnings. 
Results from my logistic regression analyses indicate that the set of variables that are 
associated with early warning disclosures differ for accelerated and non-accelerated 
firms. 
 As with empirical studies in general, each of the three studies in my 
dissertation is subject to some limitations. First, I only examine the period from 2007 
to 2009. These three years, particularly 2008 and 2009, have been quite turbulent; 
there was a significant economic downturn throughout the world during 2008. It is 
likely that the economic downturn would have impacted the decisions of management 
and auditors. This in turn raises questions about the generalizability of the findings. 
Second, in the context of non-accelerated filers, we are dependent on the internal 
control assessments of management. But, given regulatory and legislative actions, that 
is beyond our control. We have to accept that there could be greater cross sectional 
variations in the decisions of managements about internal control and that such 
variation is not moderated by the judgments of auditors. 
 Notwithstanding the above limitations, the results have significant implications 
for regulators, legislators, public companies, and auditors. Taken together, the results 
suggest that there are significant differences in many aspects related to internal control 
reporting between the accelerated and non-accelerated filers. While ex-ante one may 
have expected that such differences could exist, empirically showing that such 
differences exist—as well as providing evidence about the magnitude of such 
differences—is important for both practitioners and academics. This is particularly 
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true with respect to internal control reporting because, as is evident from the 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, legal and regulatory requirements related 
to internal control reporting are far from settled. The results also show that there are 
some areas of similarities between accelerated and non-accelerated filers. Overall, the 
results provide empirical grounding for any future legislative or regulatory actions 
related to internal control reporting, by both accelerated and non-accelerated filers.  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection for Audit Fee Analyses 
 
   Panel A – Sample by Year 
 2008 2009 
Total Observations from Audit Analytics (AA) 9828 9180 
Less Foreign Firms (1659) (1575) 
Less Financial Firms (SIC 60-67) (2121) (1993) 
Less Duplicates (133) (66) 
Less Fiscal year other than between 12/15 and 2/29 (1613) (1468) 
   
Total Observations from Compustat 3234 3032 
Less Firm without financial information (30) (15) 
Less Financial without audit fee data (98) (84) 
   
Total Sample from Compustat and AA 3106 2933 
Less observations not common in both years (267) (94) 
Final Sample for analysis 2839 2839 
 
      Panel B – Sample by Filer Status 
 2008 2009 
Accelerated filers 2003 1973 
Non-accelerated filers     836 866 
Total Sample of analysis 2839 2839 
 
*The Filer status is based as follows: I define firms to be accelerated if they filed both management and 
auditors report for internal control and define non-accelerated filers if a firm only had managements 
report. Some firms might have changed their status, either from accelerated to non-accelerated or vice-
versa. The status in our analysis is based on a firm’s status (as defined above) in the year of analysis. 
Hence, if a firm had both management and auditors in fiscal 2008 I classify it as accelerated filer status, 
but if that same firm has only management report in fiscal 2009 I classify that firm as non-accelerated 
filer status. 
 
      Panel C – Firms with Internal Control Weakness Disclosures 
 2008 2009 
Systemic Internal Control Weakness   
         Accelerated filers 53 32 
         Non-accelerated filers   131 139 
Total Systemic Internal Control Weaknesses  184 171 
   
Account Specific Internal Control Weaknesses   
         Accelerated filers 35 26 
         Non-accelerated filers   24 30 
Total Account-Specific Internal Control 
Weaknesses 
59 56 
Total Observations with Internal Control 
Problems 
243 227 
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 Table 2 
Descriptive statistics: Mean (median) values of variable 
Audit Fees and Audit Report Lag 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 2839) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n=2839) 
Accelerated  
(n= 2003) 
Non Accelerated  
(n = 836) 
Accelerated  
(n= 1973) 
Non Accelerated  
(n = 866) 
 
Variable 
ICW 
(n= 88) 
Non-ICW 
(n=1915) 
ICW 
(n= 155) 
Non-ICW 
(n=681) 
ICW 
(n= 58) 
Non-ICW 
(n=1915) 
ICW 
(n= 169) 
Non-ICW 
(n=697) 
LAFEE     13.80** 
(13.81) 
14.06 
(14.01) 
      11.49*** 
(11.50) 
12.13 
(12.12) 
      13.48*** 
(13.43) 
14.01 
(13.95) 
      11.45*** 
(11.35) 
12.13 
(12.12) 
LNTA        19.59*** 
(19.78) 
20.60 
(20.50) 
       15.33*** 
(15.65) 
17.38 
(17.24) 
   19.99*** 
(19.42) 
20.68 
(20.56) 
     15.46*** 
(15.51) 
17.26 
(17.23) 
RECINV 0.24 
(0.21) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.25 
(0.14) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.20 
(0.17) 
0.22 
(0.13) 
0.25 
(0.19) 
SQSEG 1.32 
(1.00) 
1.37 
(1.00) 
1.15 
(1.00) 
1.18 
(1.00) 
1.32 
(1.00) 
1.39 
(1.00) 
      1.10*** 
(1.00) 
1.17 
(1.00) 
FORGN 0.50 
(0.50) 
0.51 
(1.00) 
      0.10*** 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
0.52 
(1.00) 
      0.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
LIQ 2.57 
(1.89) 
2.43 
(1.82) 
      1.30*** 
(0.64) 
2.45 
(1.60) 
2.79 
(2.50) 
2.53 
(1.94) 
      1.37*** 
(0.64) 
2.63 
(1.69) 
ROA     -0.20** 
(-0.05) 
-0.08 
(-0.03) 
      -2.47*** 
(-0.57) 
-0.76 
(-0.11) 
      -0.20*** 
(-0.02) 
-0.04 
(-0.02) 
     -1.98*** 
(-0.43) 
-0.68 
(-0.08) 
DA 0.56 
(0.57) 
0.57 
(0.55) 
      2.70*** 
(0.80) 
1.07 
(0.56) 
0.57 
(0.55) 
0.55 
(0.52) 
      2.78*** 
(0.92) 
1.05 
(0.54) 
BIG4       0.66*** 
(1.00) 
0.84 
(1.00) 
      0.07*** 
(0.00) 
0.34 
(0.00) 
      0.69*** 
(1.00) 
0.83 
(1.00) 
      0.05*** 
(0.00) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
GC      0.10** 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
       0.61*** 
(1.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
    0.14** 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
      0.63*** 
(1.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
INITIAL       0.16*** 0.04        0.26*** 0.15     0.16** 0.04       0.29*** 0.15 
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*, **, *** Significantly different at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level from non-ICW firms, respectively 
 
Note:  The sample includes 2,839 firms (derived as described in Table 1).  The variables are defined as 
follows: 
LAFEE  = natural log of audit fees; 
LNTA  = natural log of client’s total assets; 
RECINV = proportion of total assets in accounts receivable and inventory; 
SQSEG  = square root of the number of segments; 
FORGN = 1 if the firm has foreign operations, else 0; 
LIQ  = ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities; 
ROA  = return on assets (operating income divided by total assets); 
DA  = total debt divided by total assets; 
BIG4  = 1 if Big 4 auditor, else 0; 
GC  = 1 if audit opinion modified for going concern, else 0; 
INITIAL = 1 if the audit engagement is in their first year, else 0; 
MW  = 1 if material weakness in internal control, else 0; 
REP_LAG = number of days between fiscal year-end and date of the audit report; 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
REP_LAG       86.86*** 
(75.00) 
62.44 
(59.00) 
       99.79*** 
(93.00) 
82.78 
(85.00) 
      76.86*** 
(74.50) 
61.69 
(59.00) 
       98.69*** 
(96.00) 
83.00 
(85.00) 
HITECH 0.27 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
  0.34* 
(0.00) 
0.40 
(0.00) 
LOSS       0.68*** 
(1.00) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
      0.77*** 
(1.00) 
0.64 
( 1.00) 
      0.64*** 
(1.00) 
0.36 
(0.00) 
      0.75*** 
(1.00) 
0.65 
(1.00) 
RESTAT      0.13** 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
      0.15*** 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
      0.29*** 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
      0.13*** 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
AFEE        0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
      0.21*** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
      0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
    0.18** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
AUOP        0.42*** 
(1.00) 
0.56 
(1.00) 
      0.07*** 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
    0.10** 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
XDOPS 0.19 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
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HITECH = 1 if the firm belongs to high-tech industries (three-digit SIC codes 283,284, 357, 366,  
       367, 371, 382, 384, and 737), 0 otherwise; 
LOSS  = 1 if the firm reports a loss before extraordinary items, else 0; 
RESTAT = 1 if the firm restated its financial reports in the current year, else 0; 
AFEE  = total audit fees divided by total assets; 
AUOP  = 1 if the firm receives modified auditor’s opinion other than going concern, else 0; 
XDOPS  = 1 if the firm has extraordinary items on its financial statement, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Fees 
 
Model: LAFEE = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + b11*MW + b12-
21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been suppressed 
in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 2839) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n= 2839) 
Variable Accelerated 
(n=2003) 
Non-
Accelerated 
(n=836) 
Accelerated 
(n=1973) 
Non-Accelerated 
 (n=866) 
Intercept 10.08 
(<.01) 
10.11 
(<.01) 
10.00 
(<.01) 
10.57 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.45 
(<.01) 
0.39 
(<.01) 
0.45 
(<.01) 
0.36 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.57 
(<.01) 
0.22 
(.03) 
0.74 
(<.01) 
0.29 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 0.14 
(<.01) 
0.17 
(.01) 
0.15 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(.19) 
FORGN 0.37 
(<.01) 
0.31 
(<.01) 
0.32 
(<.01) 
0.31 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.01 
(.41) 
-0.01 
(.34) 
-0.01 
(.36) 
-0.03 
(<.01) 
ROA -0.11 
(<.01) 
-0.05 
(<.01) 
-0.03 
(.21) 
-0.07 
(<.01) 
DA 0.21 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(<.01) 
0.18 
(<.01) 
0.03 
(.02) 
BIG4 0.29 
(<.01) 
0.49 
(<.01) 
0.25 
(<.01) 
0.49 
(<.01) 
GC 0.17 
(.02) 
0.06 
(.21) 
0.21 
(<.01) 
0.01 
(.49) 
INITIAL -0.46 
(<.01) 
-0.47 
(<.01) 
-0.71 
(<.01) 
-0.52 
(<.01) 
MW 0.25 
(<.01) 
0.13 
(.03) 
0.26 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(.10) 
 F = 287.01 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.74 
F = 96.76 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
F = 280.88 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.74 
F = 101.70 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
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Table 4 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Fees  
(SMW & AMW) 
 
Model: LAFEE = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + b11*SMW + 
b12*AMW + b13-22*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 2839) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n= 2839) 
ariable Accelerated 
(n=2003) 
Non-
Accelerated 
(n=836) 
Accelerated 
(n=1973) 
Non-
Accelerated 
 (n=866) 
Other variables omitted for brevity 
SMW 0.34 
(<.01) 
0.10 
(.10) 
 0.47 
(<.01) 
0.01 
(.41) 
AMW 0.11 
(.13) 
0.34 
(.01) 
0.02 
(.43) 
0.23 
(.03) 
 F = 273.84 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.74 
F = 92.47 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
F = 269.04 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.74 
F = 97.20 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
 
Note: SMW = 1 if a firm reported system internal control weaknesses in internal control, else 0; 
AMW = 1 if a firm reported account specific material weaknesses in internal control, else 0; other 
variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been suppressed in the tables 
for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
 
82 
 
Table 5 
 Regression Results: Sub-samples of Firms with Clean Section 404 Opinions 
 
Model: LAFEE = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + 
b5*LIQ + b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + 
b10*INITIAL + b11*MW_08 + b12-21*(10 Industry Variables) + 
error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been 
suppressed in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2009 
Variable Accelerated 
(n=1915) 
Non-Accelerated 
 (n=697) 
Overall Sample 
(n=2612) 
Intercept 10.00 
(<.01) 
10.62 
(<.01) 
10.07 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.45 
(<.01) 
0.37 
(<.01) 
0.45 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.71 
(<.01) 
0.30 
(.01) 
0.47 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 0.15 
(<.01) 
0.01 
(.46) 
0.15 
(<.01) 
FORGN 0.32 
(<.01) 
0.29 
(<.01) 
0.33 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.01 
(.39) 
-0.02 
(.01) 
-0.01 
(.02) 
ROA -0.02 
(.25) 
-0.06 
(<.01) 
-0.07 
(<.01) 
DA 0.18 
(<.01) 
0.04 
(.04) 
0.06 
(<.01) 
BIG4 0.24 
(<.01) 
0.44 
(<.01) 
0.35 
(<.01) 
GC 0.23 
(<.01) 
0.01 
(.44) 
0.13 
(<.01) 
INITIAL -0.75 
(<.01) 
-0.57 
(<.01) 
-0.65 
(<.01) 
MW_08 0.16 
(.03) 
0.14 
(.05) 
0.14 
(<.01) 
 F = 279.22 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.74 
F = 82.39 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
F = 604.24 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.82 
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Table 6 
 Regression Results: Effects of Remediation on Audit Fees  
 
Model: LAFEE =  b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + 
b11*REMEDIATE + b12-21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
Fee Model for Fiscal Year 2009 for Firms with MW = 1 in 2008 
Variable Accelerated 
(n=83) 
Non-Accelerated 
(n= 160) 
Overall Sample 
(n= 243) 
Intercept 10.31 
(<.01) 
10.72 
(<.01) 
10.54 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.52 
(<.01) 
0.33 
(<.01) 
0.39 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.72 
(.12) 
0.29 
(.13) 
0.30 
(.09) 
SQSEG 0.03 
(.45) 
0.29 
(.10) 
0.23 
(.05) 
FORGN 0.40 
(.05) 
0.46 
(.02) 
0.50 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.03 
(.28) 
-0.08 
(.02) 
-0.06 
(.02) 
ROA -0.32 
(.20) 
-0.08 
(.01) 
-0.11 
(<.01) 
DA -0.13 
(.31) 
0.01 
(.22) 
0.01 
(.32) 
BIG4 0.21 
(.20) 
0.64 
(.01) 
0.61 
(<.01) 
GC 0.05 
(.45) 
-0.19 
(.14) 
-0.13 
(.19) 
INITIAL -0.71 
(<.01) 
-0.29 
(.02) 
-0.39 
(<.01) 
REMEDIATE -0.23 
(.16) 
0.01 
(.49) 
-0.09 
(.23) 
 F = 6.27 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.56 
F = 13.38 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.61 
F = 40.72 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.77 
 
Note: REMEDIATE = 1 if a previously disclosed material weakness was remediated and there 
is a clean Section 404 opinion; else 0. Other variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry 
dummy variables have been suppressed in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
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Table 7 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Fees  
(Full Sample – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: LAFEE = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + b11*MW + 
b12-21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been 
suppressed in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 1801) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n= 1812) 
Variable Non-Large  
Accelerated 
(n=965) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n=836) 
Non-Large  
Accelerated  
(n=946) 
Non-
Accelerated 
 (n=866) 
Intercept 10.70 
(<.01) 
10.11 
(<.01) 
10.52 
(<.01) 
10.57 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.37 
(<.01) 
0.39 
(<.01) 
0.37 
(<.01) 
0.36 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.37 
(<.01) 
0.22 
(.03) 
0.63 
(<.01) 
0.29 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 0.10 
(.02) 
0.17 
(.01) 
0.16 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(.19) 
FORGN 0.34 
(<.01) 
0.31 
(<.01) 
0.30 
(<.01) 
0.31 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.01 
(.27) 
-0.01 
(.34) 
-0.01 
(.18) 
-0.03 
(<.01) 
ROA -0.10 
(.03) 
-0.05 
(<.01) 
-0.02 
(.24) 
-0.07 
(<.01) 
DA 0.15 
(.01) 
0.06 
(<.01) 
0.15 
(<.01) 
0.03 
(.02) 
BIG4 0.37 
(<.01) 
0.49 
(<.01) 
0.34 
(<.01) 
0.49 
(<.01) 
GC 0.14 
(.08) 
0.06 
(.21) 
0.15 
(.10) 
0.01 
(.49) 
INITIAL -0.56 
(<.01) 
-0.47 
(<.01) 
-0.65 
(<.01) 
-0.52 
(<.01) 
MW 0.29 
(<.01) 
0.13 
(.03) 
0.24 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(.10) 
 F = 54.63 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.53 
F = 96.76 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
F = 53.66 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.53 
F = 101.70 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
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Table 8 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Fees 
(Common Observations – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: LAFEE = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + b11*MW + 
b12-21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been 
suppressed in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 1657) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n= 1657) 
Variable Non-Large 
 Accelerated 
(n=849) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n=808) 
Non-Large  
Accelerated  
(n=807) 
Non-
Accelerated 
 (n=850) 
Intercept 10.68 
(<.01) 
10.14 
(<.01) 
10.72 
(<.01) 
10.54 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.36 
(<.01) 
0.39 
(<.01) 
0.35 
(<.01) 
0.37 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.37 
(<.01) 
0.21 
(.04) 
0.57 
(<.01) 
0.28 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 0.11 
(.03) 
0.16 
(.02) 
0.13 
(<.01) 
0.05 
(.23) 
FORGN 0.35 
(<.01) 
0.32 
(<.01) 
0.28 
(<.01) 
0.33 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.01 
(.46) 
-0.01 
(.27) 
-0.01 
(.27) 
-0.02 
(.01) 
ROA -0.07 
(.15) 
-0.05 
(<.01) 
-0.03 
(.19) 
-0.07 
(<.01) 
DA 0.25 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(<.01) 
0.14 
(<.01) 
0.03 
(.03) 
BIG4 0.38 
(<.01) 
0.48 
(<.01) 
0.37 
(<.01) 
0.48 
(<.01) 
GC 0.14 
(.12) 
0.04 
(.27) 
0.07 
(.30) 
0.01 
(.42) 
INITIAL -0.53 
(<.01) 
-0.48 
(<.01) 
-0.57 
(<.01) 
-0.52 
(<.01) 
MW 0.31 
(<.01) 
0.13 
(.03) 
0.27 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(.18) 
 F = 46.44 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.52 
F = 87.37 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.68 
F = 36.46 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.50 
F = 102.78 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
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 Table 9 
 Regression Results: Sub-samples of Firms with Clean Section 404 Opinions 
(Common Observations – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: LAFEE = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + 
b5*LIQ + b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + 
b11*MW_08 + b12-21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
Fiscal Year 2009 
Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
 (n=765) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
 (n=684) 
Overall  
Sample 
(n=1449) 
Intercept 10.76 
(<.01) 
10.60 
(<.01) 
10.45 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.34 
(<.01) 
0.38 
(<.01) 
0.40 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.57 
(<.01) 
0.29 
(.01) 
0.36 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 0.13 
(.01) 
0.01 
(.45) 
0.10 
(.02) 
FORGN 0.28 
(<.01) 
0.31 
(<.01) 
0.32 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.01 
(.36) 
-0.02 
(.04) 
-0.01 
(.11) 
ROA -0.04 
(.15) 
-0.06 
(<.01) 
-0.06 
(<.01) 
DA 0.14 
(<.01) 
0.04 
(.03) 
0.05 
(<.01) 
BIG4 0.38 
(<.01) 
0.44 
(<.01) 
0.44 
(<.01) 
GC 0.13 
(.18) 
0.02 
(.39) 
0.03 
(.34) 
INITIAL -0.66 
(<.01) 
-0.56 
(<.01) 
-0.60 
(<.01) 
MW_08 0.21 
(.02) 
0.19 
(.03) 
0.20 
(<.01) 
 F = 35.65 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.48 
F = 82.58 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.70 
F = 193.18 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.73 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been 
suppressed in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
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Table 10 
 Regression Results: Effects of Remediation 
(Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: LAFEE =  b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + 
b11*REMEDIATE + b12-21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been 
suppressed in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
Fee Model for Fiscal Year 2009 for Firms with MW = 1 in 
2008 
Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
(n=54) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n= 157) 
Overall 
Sample 
(n= 211) 
Intercept 9.21 
(<.01) 
10.72 
(<.01) 
10.71 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.82 
(<.01) 
0.33 
(<.01) 
0.39 
(<.01) 
RECINV 1.02 
(.15) 
0.28 
(.13) 
0.26 
(.14) 
SQSEG -0.23 
(.22) 
0.24 
(.14) 
0.12 
(.22) 
FORGN 0.39 
(.13) 
0.51 
(.01) 
0.49 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.02 
(.40) 
-0.07 
(.02) 
-0.06 
(.02) 
ROA -0.58 
(.18) 
-0.08 
(.01) 
-0.11 
(<.01) 
DA -0.24 
(.30) 
0.03 
(.21) 
0.01 
(.30) 
BIG4 -0.05 
(.45) 
0.68 
(.01) 
0.68 
(<.01) 
GC 0.41 
(.26) 
-0.18 
(.15) 
-0.17 
(.16) 
INITIAL -0.63 
(.05) 
-0.31 
(.01) 
-0.36 
(<.01) 
REMEDIATE -0.19 
(.28) 
0.01 
(.45) 
-0.04 
(.37) 
 F = 3.17 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.45 
F = 12.80 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.60 
F = 27.80 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.72 
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Table 11 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness in Internal Controls on Audit Fees 
(Same Filer Status – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: LAFEE = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + b11*MW + b12-
21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been suppressed 
in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 1561) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n= 1561) 
Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
(n=780) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n=781) 
Non-Large 
Accelerated  
(n=780) 
Non-
Accelerated 
 (n=781) 
Intercept 10.62 
(<.01) 
10.14 
(<.01) 
10.84 
(<.01) 
10.51 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.36 
(<.01) 
0.39 
(<.01) 
0.33 
(<.01) 
0.37 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.40 
(<.01) 
0.19 
(.06) 
0.51 
(<.01) 
0.34 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 0.11 
(.03) 
0.16 
(.02) 
0.11 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(.21) 
FORGN 0.33 
(<.01) 
0.30 
(<.01) 
0.26 
(<.01) 
0.28 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.01 
(.40) 
-0.01 
(.25) 
-0.01 
(.35) 
-0.02 
(.02) 
ROA -0.10 
(.08) 
-0.05 
(<.01) 
-0.05 
(.12) 
-0.07 
(<.01) 
DA 0.22 
(<.01) 
0.07 
(<.01) 
0.21 
(<.01) 
0.03 
(.03) 
BIG4 0.41 
(<.01) 
0.48 
(<.01) 
0.35 
(<.01) 
0.50 
(<.01) 
GC 0.15 
(.16) 
0.04 
(.30) 
0.03 
(.42) 
0.02 
(.36) 
INITIAL -0.46 
(<.01) 
-0.47 
(<.01) 
-0.59 
(<.01) 
-0.53 
(<.01) 
MW 0.42 
(<.01) 
0.13 
(.03) 
0.25 
(<.01) 
0.04 
(.27) 
 F = 39.90 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.49 
F = 85.96 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.69 
F = 34.32 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.46 
F = 97.67 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.71 
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Table 12 
 Regression Results: Sub-samples of Firms with Clean Section 404 Opinions 
(Same Filer Status – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: LAFEE = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + 
b5*LIQ + b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + 
b11*MW_08 + b12-21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2009 
Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
 (n=743) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
 (n=622) 
Overall  
Sample 
(n=1365) 
Intercept 10.89 
(<.01) 
10.49 
(<.01) 
10.43 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.32 
(<.01) 
0.38 
(<.01) 
0.40 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.51 
(<.01) 
0.32 
(<.01) 
0.34 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 0.11 
(.02) 
0.04 
(.31) 
0.10 
(.01) 
FORGN 0.26 
(<.01) 
0.28 
(<.01) 
0.30 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.01 
(.40) 
-0.02 
(.07) 
-0.01 
(.14) 
ROA -0.06 
(.09) 
-0.06 
(<.01) 
-0.05 
(<.01) 
DA 0.21 
(<.01) 
0.04 
(.03) 
0.05 
(<.01) 
BIG4 0.35 
(<.01) 
0.45 
(<.01) 
0.44 
(<.01) 
GC 0.08 
(.30) 
0.03 
(.36) 
0.02 
(.38) 
INITIAL -0.69 
(<.01) 
-0.57 
(<.01) 
-0.62 
(<.01) 
MW_08 0.24 
(.01) 
0.23 
(.02) 
0.22 
(<.01) 
 F = 34.29 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.48 
F = 79.89 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.71 
F = 194.81 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.74 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been 
suppressed in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
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Table 13 
 Regression Results: Effects of Remediation 
(Same Filer Status – Non-Large Accelerated Filers)  
 
Model: LAFEE =  b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*RECINV + b3*SQSEG + b4*FORGN + b5*LIQ + 
b6*ROA + b7*DA +b8*BIG4 + b9*GC + b10*INITIAL + 
b11*REMEDIATE + b12-21*(10 Industry Variables) + error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2. Industry dummy variables have been suppressed 
in the tables for brevity. P-values are in parentheses 
 
 
  
Fee Model for Fiscal Year 2009 for Firms with MW = 1 in 2008 
Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
(n=48) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n= 147) 
Overall  
Sample 
(n= 195) 
Intercept 8.49 
(<.01) 
10.78 
(<.01) 
10.75 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.97 
(<.01) 
0.35 
(<.01) 
0.39 
(<.01) 
RECINV 0.61 
(.30) 
0.33 
(.11) 
0.34 
(.09) 
SQSEG -0.21 
(.26) 
0.13 
(.30) 
0.07 
(.35) 
FORGN 0.63 
(.07) 
0.36 
(.06) 
0.43 
(<.01) 
LIQ -0.02 
(.43) 
-0.07 
(.03) 
-0.07 
(.02) 
ROA -0.54 
(.31) 
-0.08 
(.01) 
-0.11 
(<.01) 
DA -0.25 
(.31) 
0.03 
(.20) 
0.02 
(.30) 
BIG4 -0.41 
(.15) 
0.68 
(.02) 
0.70 
(<.01) 
GC 0.94 
(.14) 
-0.16 
(.19) 
-0.17 
(.17) 
INITIAL -0.92 
(.02) 
-0.34 
(.01) 
-0.40 
(<.01) 
REMEDIATE -0.26 
(.24) 
0.06 
(.34) 
-0.02 
(.46) 
 F = 2.45 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.38 
F = 10.19 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.56 
F = 25.50 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.72 
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Table 14 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Report Lag 
 
Model: REP_LAG =   b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ b5*DA + 
b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + b10*GC + 
b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13MW + error 
 
Fiscal 2008 
(n= 2839) 
Fiscal 2009 
(n= 2839) 
Variable Accelerated  
(n= 2003) 
Non-
Accelerated 
(n = 836) 
Accelerated  
 (n= 1973) 
Non-
Accelerated  
(n = 866) 
Intercept 76.13 
(<.01) 
78.36 
(<.01) 
77.94 
(<.01) 
85.65 
(<.01) 
LNTA -2.20 
(<.01) 
-1.63 
(<.01) 
-2.48 
(<.01) 
-1.98 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 1.08 
(.06) 
5.57 
(<.01) 
-0.07 
(.45) 
0.71 
(.33) 
HITECH -0.75 
(.15) 
-1.67 
(.10) 
-1.13 
(.04) 
-1.56 
(.10) 
ROA -0.15 
(.28) 
0.92 
(.01) 
1.21 
(.05) 
0.99 
(<.01) 
DA 0.31 
(.38) 
1.39 
(<.01) 
1.11 
(.07) 
0.69 
(.03) 
LOSS 3.51 
(<.01) 
4.72 
(<.01) 
2.45 
(<.01) 
3.73 
(<.01) 
RESTAT -0.51 
(.36) 
-2.57 
(.19) 
-1.70 
(.08) 
-1.00 
(32) 
AFEE -34.68 
(.32) 
-2.98 
(.05) 
-9.34 
(.45) 
-1.46 
(.15) 
AUOP -2.65 
(<.01) 
-5.15 
(<.01) 
-0.82 
(.06) 
-0.29 
(.43) 
GC 9.42 
(<.01) 
4.96 
(<.01) 
3.92 
(.01) 
4.16 
(<.01) 
XDOPS -1.55 
(.03) 
0.13 
(.48) 
-0.38 
(.29) 
2.51 
(.07) 
INITIAL 1.86 
(.11) 
2.96 
(.03) 
4.37 
(<.01) 
2.82 
(.03) 
MW 20.02 
(<.01) 
10.47 
(<.01) 
10.49 
(<.01) 
9.92 
(<.01) 
 F = 50.36 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.24 
F = 25.10 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.27 
F = 39.37 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.21 
F = 21.23 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.23 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses. 
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                                                         Table 15 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Report Lag 
(SMW & AMW) 
 
Model: REP_LAG = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ b5*DA 
+ b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + b10*GC + 
b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13SMW + b14AMW + error 
 
Fiscal 2008 
(n= 2839) 
Fiscal 2009 
(n= 2839) 
Variable Accelerated  
(n= 2003) 
Non- 
Accelerated  
(n = 836) 
Accelerated 
(n= 1973) 
Non 
Accelerated  
(n = 866) 
Other variables omitted for brevity 
SMW 19.26 
(<.01) 
10.64 
(<.01) 
15.85 
(<.01) 
9.37 
(<.01) 
AMW 21.19 
(<.01) 
9.56 
(<.01) 
4.08 
(.04) 
12.19 
(<.01) 
 F = 46.76 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.24 
F = 23.29 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.27 
F = 37.94 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.21 
F = 19.77 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.23 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses. 
93 
 
                                                          Table 16 
Regression Results: Sub-samples of Firms with Clean Section 404 Opinions 
 
Model: REP_LAG =   b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ 
b5*DA + b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP 
+ b10*GC + b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13MW_08 + 
error 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2009 
 Variable 
Accelerated 
(n= 1915) 
Non Accelerated  
(n = 697) 
Overall Sample 
(n=2612) 
Intercept 78.48 
(<.01) 
84.51 
(<.01) 
86.94 
(<.01) 
LNTA -2.57 
(<.01) 
-2.30 
(<.01) 
-3.57 
(<.01) 
SQSEG -0.03 
(.47) 
2.78 
(.05) 
0.23 
(.35) 
HITECH -0.95 
(.07) 
-0.36 
(.39) 
-1.68 
(<.01) 
ROA 0.99 
(.09) 
0.68 
(.08) 
1.12 
(<.01) 
DA 1.00 
(.09) 
0.49 
(.14) 
0.74 
(.02) 
LOSS 2.20 
(<.01) 
1.47 
(.14) 
2.18 
(<.01) 
RESTAT -2.23 
(.05) 
0.09 
(.49) 
-1.66 
(.10) 
AFEE -65.04 
(.20) 
-3.31 
(.10) 
-4.52 
(.02) 
AUOP -0.52 
(.17) 
1.36 
(.21) 
-0.68 
(.12) 
GC 5.53 
(<.01) 
4.98 
(<.01) 
6.30 
(<.01) 
XDOPS -0.38 
(.29) 
2.35 
(.10) 
0.31 
(.33) 
INITIAL 3.57 
(.01) 
1.97 
(.12) 
4.42 
(<.01) 
MW_08 3.87 
(<.01) 
7.06 
(<.01) 
5.24 
(<.01) 
 F = 33.24 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.18 
F = 11.16 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.16 
F = 127.12 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.39 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses. 
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                                                     Table 17 
 Regression Results: Effects of Remediation on Audit Report Lag 
 
Model: REP_LAG =   b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ b5*DA + 
b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + b10*GC + 
b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13REMEDIATE + error 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
Lag Model for Fiscal Year 2009 for Firms with MW = 1 in 2008 Variable Accelerated  
(n= 83) 
Non-Accelerated  
(n = 160) 
Overall Sample 
(n = 243 
Intercept 87.16 
(<.01) 
93.47 
(<.01) 
104.46 
(<.01) 
LNTA -2.29 
(.04) 
1.08 
(.17) 
-2.37 
(<.01) 
SQSEG -0.98 
(.38) 
-5.06 
(.16) 
-7.17 
(.01) 
HITECH -1.30 
(.36) 
-5.05 
(.04) 
-4.34 
(.03) 
ROA 12.51 
(.03) 
0.89 
(.15) 
1.53 
(.03) 
DA 6.97 
(.05) 
1.55 
(.03) 
1.20 
(.05) 
LOSS 4.00 
(.12) 
8.51 
(.01) 
5.67 
(.02) 
RESTAT -5.85 
(.03) 
-2.04 
(.30) 
-4.75 
(.04) 
AFEE 479.21 
(.08) 
1.34 
(.23) 
-0.60 
(.34) 
AUOP -1.79 
(.31) 
-4.34 
(.23) 
-5.20 
(.08) 
GC -2.76 
(.33) 
1.44 
(.35) 
-0.02 
(.50) 
XDOPS -1.80 
(.33) 
0.70 
(.43) 
4.48 
(.07) 
INITIAL 12.22 
(<.01) 
2.66 
(.21) 
4.80 
(.04) 
REMEDIATE -9.71 
(<.01) 
-4.67 
(.07) 
-8.74 
(<.01) 
 F = 2.36 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.18 
F = 2.00 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.08 
F = 10.34 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.33 
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Table 18 
Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Report Lag 
(Full Sample – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: REP_LAG = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ b5*DA + 
b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + b10*GC + 
b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13MW + error 
 
  Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 1801) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n= 1812) 
Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
(n=965) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n=836) 
Non-Large 
Accelerated  
(n=946) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
 (n=866) 
Intercept 61.81 
(<.01) 
78.36 
(<.01) 
74.54 
(<.01) 
85.65 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.45 
(.21) 
-1.63 
(<.01) 
-1.58 
(<.01) 
-1.98 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 1.92 
(.05) 
5.56 
(<.01) 
-0.16 
(.43) 
0.71 
(.33) 
HITECH 0.58 
(.30) 
-1.68 
(.10) 
-0.63 
(.24) 
-1.56 
(.08) 
ROA 1.26 
(.15) 
0.92 
(.02) 
1.22 
(.09) 
0.99 
(<.01) 
DA -0.07 
(.49) 
1.40 
(<.01) 
0.63 
(.24) 
0.69 
(.03) 
LOSS 3.28 
(<.01) 
4.72 
(<.01) 
1.30 
(.06) 
3.73 
(<.01) 
RESTAT -0.79 
(.35) 
-2.57 
(.15) 
-1.68 
(.17) 
-1.00 
(32) 
AFEE 53.19 
(.32) 
-2.98 
(.05) 
23.20 
(.42) 
-1.45 
(.03) 
AUOP -1.76 
(.03) 
-5.15 
(<.01) 
-0.84 
(.16) 
-0.29 
(.43) 
GC 10.46 
(<.01) 
4.96 
(<.01) 
3.32 
(.08) 
4.16 
(<.01) 
XDOPS -2.04 
(.06) 
0.13 
(.48) 
-1.55 
(.06) 
2.51 
(.07) 
INITIAL 1.45 
(.21) 
2.95 
(.03) 
2.86 
(.05) 
2.81 
(.03) 
MW 21.24 
(<.01) 
10.47 
(<.01) 
10.84 
(<.01) 
9.92 
(<.01) 
 F = 16.46 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.17 
F = 25.10 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.27 
F = 6.88 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.10 
F = 21.23 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.23 
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Table 19 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Report Lag 
(Common Observations – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: REP_LAG = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ b5*DA + 
b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + b10*GC + 
b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13MW + error 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses. 
 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 1657) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n= 1657) 
Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
(n=849) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n=808) 
Non-Large 
Accelerated  
(n=807) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
 (n=850) 
Intercept 60.59 
(<.01) 
78.20 
(<.01) 
71.68 
(<.01) 
85.16 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.55 
(.20) 
-1.63 
(<.01) 
-0.86 
(.04) 
-1.86 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 2.39 
(.03) 
5.60 
(<.01) 
-0.60 
(.28) 
0.62 
(.35) 
HITECH 0.55 
(.32) 
-1.58 
(.11) 
-0.60 
(.27) 
-1.73 
(.08) 
ROA 2.12 
(.10) 
-0.95 
(<.01) 
1.09 
(.12) 
0.83 
(.02) 
DA -0.92 
(.30) 
1.41 
(<.01) 
0.59 
(.28) 
0.62 
(.05) 
LOSS 3.00 
(<.01) 
5.10 
(<.01) 
1.31 
(.08) 
4.17 
(<.01) 
RESTAT -1.64 
(.23) 
-2.43 
(.16) 
-1.39 
(.24) 
-0.81 
(36) 
AFEE 200.45 
(.08) 
-2.98 
(.05) 
58.69 
(.30) 
-1.52 
(.15) 
AUOP -2.18 
(.02) 
-5.37 
(<.01) 
0.55 
(.28) 
-0.39 
(.41) 
GC 10.07 
(<.01) 
4.73 
(<.01) 
3.07 
(.12) 
3.65 
(<.01) 
XDOPS -1.51 
(.15) 
0.02 
(.50) 
-1.07 
(.20) 
2.79 
(.05) 
INITIAL 2.30 
(.14) 
2.94 
(.03) 
3.10 
(.05) 
2.90 
(.02) 
MW 20.70 
(<.01) 
10.63 
(<.01) 
8.88 
(<.01) 
10.41 
(<.01) 
 F = 13.49 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.16 
F = 23.99 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.27 
F = 3.45 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.10 
F = 20.81 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.23 
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Table 20 
Regression Results: Sub-samples of Firms with Clean Section 404 Opinions 
(Common Observations – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: REP_LAG = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ 
b5*DA + b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + 
b10*GC + b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13MW_08 + error 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2009 
 Variable Non-Large  
Accelerated 
 (n=765) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
 (n=684) 
Overall 
 Sample 
(n=1449) 
Intercept 73.70 
(<.01) 
83.87 
(<.01) 
87.26 
(<.01) 
LNTA -1.19 
(<.01) 
-2.17 
(<.01) 
-3.25 
(<.01) 
SQSEG -0.71 
(.24) 
2.75 
(.05) 
0.40 
(.33) 
HITECH -0.35 
(.36) 
-0.51 
(.34) 
-1.94 
(.01) 
ROA 0.91 
(.16) 
0.40 
(.21) 
0.91 
(.02) 
DA 0.55 
(.30) 
0.38 
(.20) 
0.61 
(.06) 
LOSS 0.90 
(.16) 
1.88 
(.09) 
1.40 
(.04) 
RESTAT -3.04 
(.10) 
0.70 
(.40) 
-0.82 
(.33) 
AFEE -20.30 
(.43) 
-3.60 
(.08) 
-4.28 
(.04) 
AUOP 1.46 
(.06) 
1.36 
(.21) 
0.87 
(.17) 
GC 5.21 
(.04) 
4.43 
(<.01) 
6.29 
(<.01) 
XDOPS -1.11 
(.20) 
2.64 
(.08) 
0.73 
(.27) 
INITIAL 1.50 
(.22) 
2.12 
(.10) 
3.30 
(<.01) 
MW_08 4.54 
(.02) 
7.59 
(<.01) 
5.56 
(<.01) 
 F = 1.90 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.02 
F = 10.79 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.16 
F = 36.99 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.25 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 21 
 Regression Results: Effects of Remediation 
(Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: REP_LAG =   b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ b5*DA + 
b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + b10*GC + 
b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13REMEDIATE + error 
 
 
Lag Model for Fiscal Year 2009 for Firms with MW = 1 in 
2008 Variable Non-Large  
Accelerated 
(n=54) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n= 157) 
Overall  
Sample 
(n= 211) 
Intercept 77.92 
(<.01) 
93.23 
(<.01) 
102.59 
(<.01) 
LNTA -0.53 
(.40) 
1.31 
(.10) 
-1.27 
(.06) 
SQSEG -0.84 
(.41) 
-5.39 
(.15) 
-8.28 
(.01) 
HITECH 1.49 
(.34) 
-5.04 
(.04) 
-4.39 
(.04) 
ROA 16.46 
(.03) 
0.86 
(.15) 
1.33 
(.06) 
DA 10.51 
(.04) 
1.62 
(.02) 
1.35 
(.04) 
LOSS 4.00 
(.17) 
8.90 
(<.01) 
6.04 
(.02) 
RESTAT -6.63 
(.05) 
-1.10 
(.38) 
-5.26 
(.04) 
AFEE 485.16 
(.10) 
1.52 
(.20) 
-0.07 
(.49) 
AUOP 1.75 
(.37) 
-5.90 
(.16) 
-3.57 
(.22) 
GC -0.85 
(.46) 
0.59 
(.44) 
0.68 
(.42) 
XDOPS -4.16 
(.22) 
2.10 
(.30) 
4.21 
(.10) 
INITIAL 15.29 
(<.01) 
3.07 
(.18) 
4.61 
(.06) 
REMEDIATE -12.72 
(<.01) 
-4.23 
(.08) 
-7.94 
(<.01) 
 F = 1.83 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.17 
F = 2.01 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.08 
F = 5.85 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.23 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses.
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Table 22 
 Regression Results: Effects of Material Weakness on Audit Report Lag 
(Same Filer Status – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: REP_LAG = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ b5*DA + 
b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + b10*GC + 
b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13MW + error 
 
Fiscal Year 2008 
(n= 1561) 
Fiscal Year 2009 
(n= 1561) 
Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
(n=780) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n=781) 
Non-Large  
Accelerated  
(n=780) 
Non-
Accelerated 
 (n=781) 
Intercept 59.51 
(<.01) 
78.17 
(<.01) 
71.17 
(<.01) 
85.08 
(<.01) 
LNTA 0.87 
(.10) 
-1.71 
(<.01) 
-0.76 
(.08) 
-1.94 
(<.01) 
SQSEG 1.56 
(12) 
5.76 
(<.01) 
-0.56 
(.30) 
1.26 
(.23) 
HITECH 0.87 
(.24) 
-1.62 
(.11) 
-0.64 
(.26) 
-1.70 
(.08) 
ROA 2.29 
(.13) 
1.01 
(<.01) 
1.20 
(.12) 
0.88 
(.01) 
DA -0.83 
(.32) 
1.38 
(<.01) 
-0.01 
(.50) 
0.64 
(.04) 
LOSS 1.99 
(.06) 
5.75 
(<.01) 
1.37 
(.08) 
3.71 
(<.01) 
RESTAT -1.93 
(.20) 
-2.32 
(.16) 
-0.55 
(.40) 
-1.52 
(24) 
AFEE 299.71 
(.05) 
-2.84 
(.05) 
81.13 
(.25) 
-1.51 
(.30) 
AUOP -2.21 
(.02) 
-5.10 
(<.01) 
0.67 
(.25) 
-0.39 
(.41) 
GC 8.16 
(.01) 
4.22 
(<.01) 
3.90 
(.08) 
3.66 
(.02) 
XDOPS -1.45 
(.15) 
-0.42 
(.41) 
-1.06 
(.20) 
2.32 
(.11) 
INITIAL 3.51 
(.05) 
2.50 
(.06) 
2.81 
(.08) 
3.53 
(.01) 
MW 21.32 
(<.01) 
10.54 
(<.01) 
8.85 
(<.01) 
9.89 
(<.01) 
 F = 10.77 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.14 
F = 23.87 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.27 
F = 3.09 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.10 
F = 19.25 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.23 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses.
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                                                          Table 23 
Regression Results: Sub-samples of Firms with Clean Section 404 Opinions 
(Same Filer Status – Non-Large Accelerated Filers) 
 
Model: REP_LAG = b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ 
b5*DA + b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + 
b10*GC + b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13MW_08 + error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses.
 
Fiscal Year 2009 
 Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
 (n=743) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
 (n=622) 
Overall  
Sample 
(n=1365) 
Intercept 73.50 
(<.01) 
84.18 
(<.01) 
87.61 
(<.01) 
LNTA -1.19 
(.02) 
-2.20 
(<.01) 
-3.29 
(<.01) 
SQSEG -0.62 
(.30) 
2.90 
(.05) 
0.39 
(.30) 
HITECH -0.43 
(.34) 
-0.45 
(.37) 
-2.09 
(<.01) 
ROA 0.92 
(.16) 
0.46 
(.18) 
0.90 
(.02) 
DA 0.42 
(.38) 
0.43 
(.19) 
0.69 
(.05) 
LOSS 1.03 
(.14) 
1.63 
(.13) 
1.16 
(.09) 
RESTAT -2.55 
(.15) 
0.25 
(.47) 
-1.05 
(.30) 
AFEE -13.39 
(.46) 
-3.53 
(.09) 
-4.42 
(.04) 
AUOP 1.46 
(.06) 
1.05 
(.28) 
0.70 
(.23) 
GC 5.29 
(.05) 
3.97 
(.02) 
5.69 
(<.01) 
XDOPS -1.09 
(.20) 
2.31 
(.15) 
0.22 
(.43) 
INITIAL 1.33 
(.26) 
2.49 
(.08) 
3.80 
(<.01) 
MW_08 4.40 
(.03) 
7.09 
(<.01) 
5.26 
(<.01) 
 F = 1.68 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.02 
F = 9.37 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.15 
F = 34.73 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.24 
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                                                  Table 24 
 Regression Results: Effects of Remediation Audit 
(Same Filer Status) 
 
Model: REP_LAG =   b0 + b1*LNTA + b2*SQSEG + + b3*HITECH + b4*ROA+ b5*DA + 
b6*LOSS + b7*RESTAT + b8*AFEE + b9*AUOP + b10*GC + 
b11*XDOPS + b12*INITIAL + b13REMEDIATE + error 
 
 
Lag Model for Fiscal Year 2009 for Firms with MW = 1 in 
2008 Variable Non-Large 
Accelerated 
(n=48) 
Non- 
Accelerated 
(n= 147) 
Overall  
Sample 
(n= 195) 
Intercept 83.75 
(<.01) 
89.20 
(<.01) 
101.04 
(<.01) 
LNTA -1.71 
(.27) 
0.76 
(.23) 
-1.68 
(.02) 
SQSEG -0.83 
(.42) 
-1.86 
(.36) 
-6.75 
(.03) 
HITECH 0.44 
(.47) 
-4.33 
(.08) 
-3.70 
(.07) 
ROA 27.09 
(.09) 
1.02 
(.10) 
1.47 
(.04) 
DA 10.49 
(.07) 
1.67 
(.02) 
1.46 
(.05) 
LOSS 6.50 
(.13) 
8.38 
(.01) 
5.34 
(.04) 
RESTAT -5.88 
(.10) 
-0.29 
(.47) 
-5.19 
(.05) 
AFEE 563.96 
(.10) 
1.24 
(.25) 
-0.24 
(.45) 
AUOP 0.32 
(.49) 
-3.64 
(.28) 
-2.96 
(.27) 
GC 2.47 
(.41) 
1.28 
(.37) 
0.83 
(.41) 
XDOPS -5.20 
(.20) 
2.75 
(.26) 
3.62 
(.15) 
INITIAL 16.37 
(<.01) 
3.10 
(.17) 
5.40 
(.04) 
REMEDIATE -12.83 
(.01) 
-3.06 
(.15) 
-6.69 
(.01) 
 F = 1.64 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.15 
F = 1.68 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.06 
F = 5.93 
p < .001 
Adj. R2 = 0.25 
Note: Variables are defined as in Table 2; P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 25 
Sample Selection for Prior 302 Warning Analyses 
   Panel A: Audit Analystics 
 2007 2008 2009 
Total Firms with Management Reports 9704 9828 9180 
Less Foreign Firms (1525) (1659) (1575) 
Less Financial Firms (SIC 60-67) (2099) (2121) (1993) 
Less Duplicates (95) (133) (66) 
 5985 5915 5606 
Total Firms with Auditor Reports 4615 4472 3927 
Less Foreign Firms (681) (682) (597) 
Less Financial Firms (SIC 60-67) (981) (964) (865) 
Less Duplicates (23) (27) (12) 
 2930 2799 2453 
Total Merged Sample 5985 5915 5606 
Less Fiscal year other than between 12/15 and 2/28 (1565) (1613) (1468) 
Less firms without audit fee data (187) (161) (582) 
Final Sample 4233 4141 3556 
 
           Panel B: Types of Internal Control Opinions 
 2007 2008 2009 
Non-Accelerated Filers 2028 1980 1499 
          Clean 1440 1419 1120 
          Systemic Weaknesses  513 495 323 
          Specific Weaknesses 75 66 56 
Accelerated Filers 2205 2161 2057 
          Clean 2039 2060 2001 
          Systemic Weaknesses 107 64 28 
          Specific Weaknesses 59 37 28 
103 
 
Note: Internal control weakness is classified as general if, per AuditAnalytics, the problem was in any one or more of the 
following categories: senior management competency, tone, reliability issues; accounting personnel resources, 
competency/training; segregations of duties/ design of controls (personnel); information technology, software, security & 
access issue; ethical or compliance issues with personnel; ineffective, non-existent or understaffed audit committee; 
insufficient or non-existent internal audit function; ineffective regulatory compliance issues. Also note that if a firm 
reported both, general and account specific internal control problems, then that company is coded as having a general 
problem. In only those instances where a firm has no general problem but indicates the presence of one or more account 
specific problems a firm is coded as having a specific problem. In other words, a firm coded as having only specific 
problems by definition has no general problem. 
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Panel C: Remediation of Weaknesses 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
  Year 2   Year 3  
 Clean2 AMW2 SMW2 Clean3 AMW3 SMW3 
Clean1 791 17 60 761 26 81 
SMW1 79 12 165 101 11 144 
AMW1 24 3 14 25 6 10 
       
Clean2 - - - 810 29 55 
SMW2 - - - 63 9 167 
AMW2 - - - 14 5 13 
 
Accelerated Filers 
  Year 2   Year 3  
 Clean2 AMW2 SMW2 Clean3 AMW3 SMW3 
Clean1 1757 26 22 1769 15 21 
SMW1 66 3 18 77 4 6 
AMW1 42 3 7 43 5 4 
       
Clean2 - - - 1830 18 17 
SMW2 - - - 32 5 10 
AMW2 - - - 27 1 4 
Note: Clean1, Clean2 and Clean3 represent firms that had no material weaknesses disclosed in their internal 
controls in fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. Similarly SMW1 (AMW1), SMW2 (AMW2) and 
SMW3 (AMW3) represent firms that had systemic (Account-Specific) weaknesses disclosed in their internal 
controls for fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. Since the above tables represent remediation 
information, only those observations were used that had information available for all three years.  
Table 26 
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New Problems and Prior Section 302 Disclosures 
 
   Panel A – Fiscal 2007 
 Number of Weaknesses Prior 302 disclosures Percentage 
Non-Accelerated Filers    
         Systemic Weaknesses 473 65 14% 
         Specific Weaknesses 71 14 20% 
Total Non-Accelerated  544 79 15% 
    
Accelerated Filers    
         Systemic Weaknesses 103 45 44% 
         Specific Weaknesses 58 25 43% 
Total Accelerated 161 70 44% 
 
 
   Panel B – Fiscal 2008 
 Number of Weaknesses Prior 302 disclosures Percentage 
Non-Accelerated Filers    
         Systemic Weaknesses 474 246 52% 
         Specific Weaknesses 65 28 43% 
Total Non-Accelerated  539 274 51% 
    
Accelerated Filers    
         Systemic Weaknesses 59 30 51% 
         Specific Weaknesses 37 10 27% 
Total Accelerated 96 40 42% 
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   Panel C – Fiscal 2009 
 Number of Weaknesses Prior 302 disclosures Percentage 
Non-Accelerated Filers    
         Systemic Weaknesses 318 223 70% 
         Specific Weaknesses 56 20 36% 
Total Non-Accelerated  374 243 65% 
    
Accelerated Filers    
         Systemic Weaknesses 27 12 44% 
         Specific Weaknesses 28 9 32% 
Total Accelerated 55 21 38% 
 
 
   Panel D – Overall  
 Number of Weaknesses Prior 302 disclosures Percentage 
Non-Accelerated Filers    
         Systemic Weaknesses 1256 534 42% 
         Specific Weaknesses 192 62 32% 
Total Non-Accelerated  1457 596 41% 
    
Accelerated Filers    
         Systemic Weaknesses 189 87 46% 
         Specific Weaknesses 123 44 36% 
Total Accelerated 312 131 42% 
 
Note: There were a few observations lost from Table 25 Panel B, as no prior 302 were filed for such observations. 
(Further observations for analysis were lost due to lack of financial information in Compustat; hence, out of 588 non-
accelerated filers observations for fiscal 2007 only 258 observations had financial data available, as shown in Table 29).  
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Table 27 
SEC action (Comment Letters) for firms without Prior Section 302 Disclosures 
 
Panel A – Fiscal 2007 
 Non-Accelerated Filers Accelerated Filers 
Weaknesses Without Prior 302 465 91 
   
        Systemic Weaknesses 408 58 
                Firms with SEC action             65 (16%)            9 (16%) 
   
        Specific Weaknesses 57 33 
                Firms with SEC action            15 (26%)            5 (15%) 
 
 
Panel B – Fiscal 2008 
 Non-Accelerated Filers Accelerated Filers 
Weaknesses Without Prior 302 265 56 
   
        Systemic Weaknesses 228 29 
                Firms with SEC action             45 (20%)           12 (41%) 
   
        Specific Weaknesses 37 27 
                Firms with SEC action           10 (27%)            7 (26%) 
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Panel C – Fiscal 2009 
 Non-Accelerated Filers Accelerated Filers 
Weaknesses Without Prior 302 131 34 
   
        Systemic Weaknesses 95 15 
                Firms with SEC action           12 (13%)             3 (20%) 
   
        Specific Weaknesses 36 19 
                Firms with SEC action             5 (14%)             4 (21%) 
 
 
Panel D – Overall 
 Total 
Non-Accelerated 
Total 
Accelerated Overall 
Weaknesses Without Prior 302 861 181 1042 
    
        Systemic Weaknesses             731               102          833 
                Firms with SEC action 122 (17%) 24 (24%) 146 (18%) 
    
        Specific Weaknesses            130                 79         209 
                Firms with SEC action 30 (23%) 16 (20%) 46 (22%) 
 
Note: Information regarding SEC actions (Comment Letters) are obtained from the AuditAnalytics database. The time 
period chosen for such action (letter) is 1 through 9 months after a firm’s fiscal year end. All of the fiscal year ends for 
our observations are between Dec 15th and March 1st of the following year. 
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Table 28 
Sample Composition by Industry 
Companies with Material Internal Control Weaknesses (Fiscal Year 2007) 
 
Non-Accelerated Filers 
Industry (SIC) 
Prior  
302 Disclosure 
No Prior  
302 Disclosure 
Overall 
Percentage 
Agricultural Production & Services, Mining, & Construction (1–19) 5 73 14.34 
Manufacturing (20–39) 35 185 40.44 
Transportation and Utilities (40–49) 9 40 9.01 
Wholesale and Retail (50–59) 9 42 9.38 
Services (70–89) 20 119 25.55 
Other  1 6 1.28 
Total 79 465 100.00 
 
Accelerated Filers 
Industry (SIC) 
Prior  
302 Disclosure 
No Prior  
302 Disclosure 
Overall 
Percentage 
Agricultural Production & Services, Mining, & Construction (1–19) 4 6 6.21 
Manufacturing (20–39) 29 44 45.34 
Transportation and Utilities (40–49) 12 12 14.91 
Wholesale and Retail (50–59) 6 5 6.83 
Services (70–89) 19 24 26.71 
Other - - - 
Total 70 91 100.00 
 
Note: The above industry classifications are based on Hermanson and Ye (2009). 
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Table 29  
Descriptive statistics: Mean (median) values of variables 
Prior 302 Disclosure Analyses 
 
Panel A: Prior 302 versus No Prior 302 Disclosure 
Non-Accelerated Accelerated 
Variables Prior  302 Disclosure 
(n= 55) 
No Prior  
302 Disclosure 
(n= 203) 
All Non- 
Accelerated 
(n=258) 
Prior  
302 Disclosure  
(n= 70) 
No Prior  
302 Disclosure 
(n= 91) 
All  
Accelerated 
(n=161) 
AUFEE       0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.65 
(0.02) 
0.52 
(0.02) 
   0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
LNTA      17.12*** 
(17.02) 
15.22 
(15.65) 
15.63 
(16.11) 
  20.00* 
(19.88) 
19.63 
(19.68) 
19.79 
(19.74) 
INITIAL 0.24 
(0.00) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
     0.16** 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
BIG4     0.18** 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.71 
(1.00) 
0.70 
(1.00) 
0.71 
(1.00) 
RESTAT 0.13 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
LITIG 0.31 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
GC        0.35*** 
(0.00) 
0.59 
(1.00) 
0.54 
(1.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
DNASR   0.58* 
(1.00) 
0.48 
(0.00) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
0.53 
(1.00) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
EQUIFIN       0.15*** 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
CEO_CHR 0.46 
(0.00) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
0.48 
(0.00) 
0.42 
(0.00) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
SQ_CFO_TEN      1.54*** 
(1.41) 
1.91 
(1.41) 
1.83 
(1.41) 
    1.47** 
(1.41) 
1.69 
(1.41) 
1.59 
(1.41) 
CEO_CHG 0.24 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
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NUM_AC_MEM        2.92*** 
(3.00) 
1.88 
(2.00) 
2.11 
(3.00) 
3.37 
(3.00) 
3.42 
(3.00) 
3.40 
(3.00) 
PROP_EXPT       0.45*** 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
 0.51 
(0.33) 
0.43 
(0.00) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
AC_MEET       4.20*** 
(4.00) 
2.27 
(1.00) 
2.68 
(1.00) 
      10.99*** 
(10.00) 
7.32 
(7.00) 
8.91 
(8.00) 
LOG_NUM_WK   0.71* 
(0.69) 
0.58 
(0.69) 
0.61 
(0.69) 
  0.47* 
(0.00) 
0.36 
(0.00) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
*, **, *** Significantly different at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively 
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  Panel B: Prior 302 versus No Prior 302 Disclosure (Systemic and Specific – ICW) 
Non-Accelerated Accelerated 
Systemic – ICW Specific  - ICW Systemic – ICW Specific  - ICW 
Variables Prior 
 302 
(n= 48) 
No  
Prior 302 
(n= 179) 
Prior  
302 
(n= 7) 
No Prior 
302 
(n= 24) 
Prior 3 
02 
(n= 45) 
No 
 Prior 302 
(n= 58) 
Prior  
302 
(n= 25) 
No 
 Prior 302 
(n= 33) 
AUFEE      0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.74 
(0.02) 
 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(11.98) 
   0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
  0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
LNTA       17.13*** 
(17.02) 
15.07 
(15.50) 
  17.04* 
(16.87) 
16.31 
(16.89) 
19.75 
(19.39) 
19.60 
(19.45) 
  20.45* 
(20.33) 
19.70 
(19.85) 
INITIAL 0.21 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
  0.43* 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
       0.22*** 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
BIG4     0.15** 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
  0.43* 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
0.62 
(1.00) 
0.66 
(1.00) 
0.88 
(1.00) 
0.79 
(1.00) 
RESTAT 0.15 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
LITIG 0.25 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
  0.71* 
(1.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.36 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
GC        0.38*** 
(0.00) 
0.62 
(1.00) 
 0.14 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
  0.11* 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
DNASR 0.56 
(1.00) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
  0.72* 
(1.00) 
0.42 
(0.00) 
0.47 
(0.00) 
0.57 
(1.00) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
EQUIFIN      0.11*** 
(0.00) 
0.40 
(0.00) 
0.43 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
CEO_CHR  0.42 
(0.00) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.71 
(1.00) 
0.63 
(1.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
0.36 
(0.00) 
0.48 
(0.00) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
SQ_CFO_TEN        1.40*** 
(1.41) 
1.91 
(1.41) 
2.50 
(2.45) 
1.90 
(1.73) 
1.50 
(1.41) 
1.67 
(1.41) 
     1.42** 
(2.00) 
1.75 
(1.41) 
CEO_CHG  0.23  
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
NUM_AC_MEM        2.90*** 
(3.00) 
1.81 
(2.00) 
    3.14** 
(3.00) 
2.46 
(3.00) 
3.33 
(3.00) 
3.43 
(3.00) 
3.44 
(3.00) 
3.40 
(3.00) 
PROP_EXPT       0.42*** 0.22      0.64** 0.35      0.64** 0.44  0.27 0.41 
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*, **, *** Significantly different at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively 
  
Note:  The sample includes all such firms (excluding those in SIC codes 60-67). Variables are defined as follows: 
AUFEE  = audit fees scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
LNTA   = natural log of client’s total assets; 
INITIAL  = 1 if the audit engagement is in their first year, else 0; 
BIG4   = 1 if Big 4 auditor, else 0; 
RESTAT  = 1 if a firm restated their financial statements, else 0; 
LITIG = 1 if the company is in a litigious industry: SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374,  
                                           and 8731-8734, else 0; 
GC   = 1 if audit opinion modified for going concern, else 0; 
DNASR  = 1 if the nonaudit fee ratio (the sum of tax fees and other fees divided by the sum of audit fees and audit-related  
                                           fees) is above the sample median, else 0; 
EQUIFIN           = 1 if the company’s equity issuance is greater than 10 percent of its total assets in the next fiscal year, else 0; 
CEO_CHR  = 1 if the CEO also serves as chairman of the board, else 0; 
SQ_CFO_TEN  = square root of number of years of a CFO with a firm; 
CEO_CHG  = for firms with Prior 302 disclosure = 0, 1 if the tenure of the CEO at the fiscal year-end is no greater than one  
                                           year, else 0. For firms with Prior 302 disclosure = 1, 1 if the tenure of the CEO on the earliest Section 302  
                                          disclosure date in the fiscal year is no greater than one year by that time, else 0; 
NUM_AC_MEM = number of audit committee members;  
PROP_EXPT   = proportion of audit committee members with accounting expertise; 
AC_MEET   = number of audit committee meetings held in the fiscal year; 
LOG_NUM_WK = log of number of material weaknesses; 
SMW   = 1 if a firm reported system internal control weaknesses in internal control, else 0. 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AC_MEET        4.10*** 
(4.00) 
2.09 
(1.00) 
4.86 
(5.00) 
3.63 
(3.50) 
        10.76*** 
(9.00) 
7.28 
(7.00) 
     11.40*** 
    (11.00) 
7.40 
(7.00) 
LOG_NUM_WK    0.77* 
(0.69) 
0.60 
(0.69) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
0.56 
(0.69) 
0.51 
(0.69) 
   0.32** 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
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Table 30 
Logistic Regression Results: Prior Section 302 Disclosures 
Model: PRIOR_302   = b0 + b1*AUFEE + b2*LNTA + b3*INITIAL + b4*BIG4 + 
b5*RESTAT + b6*LITIG + b7*GC + b8*DNASR + b9*EQUIFIN +b10*CEO_CHR + 
b11*SQ_CFO_TEN + b12*CEO_CHG + b13*NUM_AC_MEM + b14*PROP_EXPT 
+ b15*AC_MEET + b16*LOG_NUM_WK + b17*SMW + error 
MW in Fiscal 2007  (n= 419) 
Variables Non-Accelerated Filers 
(n= 258) 
Accelerated Filers 
(n= 161) 
Intercept -3.24 
(<.01) 
-2.96 
(.03) 
AUFEE 0.07 
(.33) 
83.84 
(.03) 
LNTA 0.37 
(<.01) 
0.42 
(.02) 
INITIAL 0.08 
(.43) 
1.59 
(.02) 
BIG4 0.07 
(.46) 
-0.51 
(.16) 
RESTAT -0.36 
(.27) 
0.02 
(.49) 
LITIG 0.25 
(.26) 
-0.01 
(.49) 
GC 0.07 
(.44) 
0.94 
(.15) 
DNASR 0.18 
(.31) 
-0.10 
(.40) 
EQUFIN -0.58 
(.12) 
0.30 
(.36) 
CEO_CHR -0.05 
(.45) 
0.30 
(.23) 
SQ_CFO_TEN -0.55 
(.01) 
-0.28 
(.19) 
CEO_CHG -0.04 
(.47) 
-0.12 
(.42) 
NUM_AC_MEM 0.47 
(<.01) 
-0.37 
(.11) 
PROP_EXPT 0.59 
(.05) 
0.24 
(.24) 
AC_MEET 0.04 
(.24) 
0.16 
(<.01) 
LOG_NUM_WK 0.19 
(.25) 
0.44 
(.13) 
SMW 0.34 
(.27) 
-0.29 
(.25) 
 L.R., Chi-Sqr = 61.31*** 
Wald, Chi-Sqr = 37.68*** 
Max. R-Sqr = 0.33 
L.R., Chi-Sqr = 39.43*** 
Wald, Chi-Sqr = 25.84** 
Max. R-Sqr = 0.29 
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